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Abstract: Actual causation is concerned with the question “what caused
what?” Consider a transition between two states within a system of inter-
acting elements, such as an artificial neural network, or a biological brain
circuit. Which combination of synapses caused the neuron to fire? Which
image features caused the classifier to misinterpret the picture? Even de-
tailed knowledge of the system’s causal network, its elements, their states,
connectivity, and dynamics does not automatically provide a straightfor-
ward answer to the “what caused what?” question. Counterfactual accounts
of actual causation based on graphical models, paired with system inter-
ventions, have demonstrated initial success in addressing specific problem
cases in line with intuitive causal judgments. Here, we start from a set of
basic requirements for causation (realization, composition, information, in-
tegration, and exclusion) and develop a rigorous, quantitative account of
actual causation that is generally applicable to discrete dynamical systems.
We present a formal framework to evaluate these causal requirements that
is based on system interventions and partitions, and considers all counter-
factuals of a state transition. This framework is used to provide a complete
causal account of the transition by identifying and quantifying the strength
of all actual causes and effects linking the two consecutive system states.
Finally, we examine several exemplary cases and paradoxes of causation
and show that they can be illuminated by the proposed framework for
quantifying actual causation.
MSC 2010 subject classifications: Primary 62-09; secondary 60-J10.
Keywords and phrases: causal networks, graphical models, integrated
information, counterfactuals, Markov condition.
1. Introduction
The nature of cause and effect has been much debated in both philosophy and
the sciences. To date, there is no single widely accepted account of causation,
and the various sciences focus on different aspects of the issue (Illari, Phyllis
and Williamson, 2011). In physics, no formal notion of causation seems even
required to describe the dynamical evolution of a system by a set of math-
ematical equations. At most, the notion of causation is reduced to the basic
∗Corresponding authors: albantakis@wisc.edu, gtononi@wisc.edu
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requirement that causes must precede and be able to influence their effects—no
further constraints are imposed as to “what caused what”.
However, a detailed record of “what happened” prior to a particular occur-
rence1 rarely provides a satisfactory explanation for why it occurred in causal,
mechanistic terms. As an example, take AlphaGo, the deep neural network that
repeatedly defeated human champions in the game Go (Silver et al., 2016).
Understanding why AlphaGo chose a particular move is a non-trivial problem
(Metz, 2016), even though all its network parameters and its state evolution
can be recorded in detail. Identifying “what caused what” becomes particu-
larly difficult in complex systems with a distributed, recurrent architecture and
wide-ranging interactions such as the brain (Sporns, Tononi and Edelman, 2000;
Wolff and O¨lveczky, 2018).
Our interest here lies in the principled analysis of actual causation in discrete
distributed dynamical systems, such as artificial neural networks, computers
made of logic gates, or cellular automata, but also biological brain circuits or
gene regulatory networks. By contrast to general (or type) causation which ad-
dresses the question whether the type of occurrence A generally “brings about”
the type of occurrence B, the underlying notion of actual (or token) causation
addresses the question “what caused what” given a specific occurrence A fol-
lowed by a specific occurrence B. For example, what part of the board’s particu-
lar pattern caused AlphaGo to decide on this particular move?2 As highlighted
by the AlphaGo example, even with detailed knowledge of all circumstances,
the prior system state, and the outcome, there often is no straightforward an-
swer to the “what caused what” question. This has also been demonstrated by
a long list of controversial examples conceived, analyzed, and debated primarily
by philosophers (e.g., Lewis (1986); Pearl (2000); Woodward (2003); Hitchcock
(2007); Paul and Hall (2013); Weslake (2015); Halpern (2016)).
During the last decades, a number of attempts to operationalize the notion
of causation and to give it a formal description have been developed, most no-
tably in computer science, probability theory, statistics (Good, 1961; Suppes,
1970; Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines, 1993; Pearl, 1988, 2000), the law (Wright,
1985), and neuroscience, (e.g., Tononi, Sporns and Edelman (1999)). Graphical
methods paired with system interventions (Pearl, 2000) have proven especially
valuable for developing causal explanations. Given a causal network that rep-
resents how the state of each variable depends on other system variables via
a “structural equation” (Pearl, 2000), it is possible to evaluate the effects of
interventions imposed from outside the network by setting certain variables to
a specific value. This operation has been formalized by Pearl, who introduced
the “do-operator”, do(X = x), which signifies that a subset of system variables
1A formal definition of the term “occurrence” is provided below in the theory section, where
it denotes a system (sub)state, i.e., a set of random variables in a particular state at a particular
time. This corresponds to the general usage of the term “event” in the computer science
and probability literature. The term “occurrence” was chosen instead to avoid philosophical
baggage associated with the term “event”.
2A question regarding general causation in the context of AlphaGo would be, e.g., whether
an opponents “moyo” (framework for establishing territory) typically causes AlphaGo to per-
form an invasion.
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X has been actively set into state x rather than being passively observed in this
state (Pearl, 2000). Because statistical dependence does not imply causal depen-
dence, the conditional probability of occurrence B after observing occurrence
A, p(B | A) may differ from the probability of occurrence B after enforcing A,
p(B | do(A)). Causal networks are a specific subset of “Bayesian” networks that
explicitly represent causal dependencies consistent with interventional proba-
bilities.
The causal networks approach has also been applied to the case of actual cau-
sation (Pearl, 2000; Hitchcock, 2001; Woodward, 2003; Halpern and Pearl, 2005;
Weslake, 2015; Halpern, 2015). There, system interventions can be used to eval-
uate whether and to what extent an occurrence was necessary or sufficient for
a subsequent occurrence by assessing counterfactuals—alternative occurrences
“counter to fact”3 (Lewis, 1973; Pearl, 2000; Woodward, 2004)—within a given
causal model. The objective is to define “what it means for A to be a cause of
B in model M” (Halpern, 2016). While promising results have been obtained
in specific cases, no single proposal to date has characterized actual causation
in a universally satisfying manner (Paul and Hall, 2013; Halpern, 2016). One
concern about existing measures of actual causation is the incremental manner
in which they progress; a definition is proposed that satisfies existing examples
in the literature, until a new problematic example is discovered, at which point
the definition is updated to address the new example (Weslake, 2015; Beckers
and Vennekens, 2018). While valuable, the problem with such an approach is
that one cannot be confident in applying the framework beyond the scope of
examples already tested. For example, while the methods are well explored in
simple binary examples, there is less evidence that the methods conform with
intuition when we consider the much larger space of non-binary examples (see
Supplementary Discussion). This is especially critical when moving beyond in-
tuitive toy examples to scientific problems where intuition is lacking, such as
understanding actual causation in biological or artificial neural networks.
Our goal is to provide a robust framework for assessing actual causation that
is based on general causal principles, and can thus be expected to naturally ex-
tend beyond simple, binary, and deterministic example cases. Below we present
a formal account of actual causation that is generally applicable to discrete
Markovian dynamical systems that are constituted of interacting elements (Fig.
1). The proposed framework is based on five causal principles identified in the
context of integrated information theory (IIT)—namely existence (here: realiza-
tion), composition, information, integration, and exclusion (Oizumi, Albantakis
and Tononi, 2014; Albantakis and Tononi, 2015)). Originally developed as a
theory of consciousness (Tononi, 2015; Tononi et al., 2016), IIT provides the
tools to characterize potential causation—the causal constraints exerted by a
mechanism in a given state.
In particular, our objective is to provide a complete, quantitative causal ac-
count of “what caused what” within a transition between consecutive system
3Note that counterfactuals here strictly refer to possible states within the system’s state
space other than the actual one and not to abstract notions such as other “possible worlds”
as in (Lewis, 1973), (see also (Pearl, 2000) Chapter 7).
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states. Our approach differs from previous accounts of actual causation in what
constitutes a complete causal account. Unlike most accounts of actual causation
(e.g., Pearl (2000); Paul and Hall (2013); Halpern (2016)), but see (Chajew-
ska and Halpern, 1997), causal links within a transition are considered from
the perspective of both causes and effects. Additionally, we not only evaluate
actual causes and effects of individual variables, but also actual causes and
effects of high-order occurrences comprising multiple variables. While some ex-
isting accounts of actual causation include the notion of being “part of a cause”
(Halpern, 2015, 2016), the possibility of multi-variate causes and effects is rarely
addressed, or even outright excluded (Weslake, 2015).
Despite the differences in what constitutes a complete causal account, our ap-
proach remains compatible with the traditional view of actual causation, which
considers only actual causes of individual variables (no high-order causation,
and no actual effects). In this context, the main difference between our proposed
framework and existing “contingency” based definitions is that we simultane-
ously consider all counterfactual states of the transition, rather than a single
contingency (e.g., Hitchcock (2001); Yablo (2002); Woodward (2003); Halpern
and Pearl (2005); Hall (2007); Halpern (2015); Weslake (2015), see Supplemen-
tary Discussion for a detailed comparison). This allows us to express the causal
analysis in probabilistic, informational terms (Ay and Polani, 2008; Korb, Ny-
berg and Hope, 2011; Janzing et al., 2013; Oizumi, Albantakis and Tononi,
2014), which has the additional benefit that our framework naturally extends
from deterministic to probabilistic causal networks, and also from binary to
multi-valued variables. Finally, it allows us to quantify the strength of all causal
links between occurrences and their causes and effects within the transition.
In the following, we will first formally describe the proposed causal framework
of actual causation. We then demonstrate its utility on a set of examples, which
illustrate the benefits of characterizing both causes and effects, the fact that
causation can be compositional, and the importance of identifying irreducible
causes and effects for obtaining a complete causal account. Finally, we illus-
trate several prominent paradoxical cases from the actual causation literature,
including overdetermination and prevention, as well as a toy-model of an image
classifier based on an artificial neural network.
2. Theory
Integrated information theory is concerned with the intrinsic cause-effect power
of a physical system (intrinsic existence). The IIT formalism (Oizumi, Alban-
takis and Tononi, 2014; Tononi, 2015) starts from a discrete distributed dynam-
ical system in its current state and asks how the system’s elements, alone and
in combination (composition), constrain the potential past and future states of
the system (information), and whether they do so above and beyond their parts
(integration). The potential causes and effects of a system subset correspond to
the set of elements over which the constraints are maximally informative and
integrated (exclusion). In the following we aim to translate IIT’s account of po-
tential causation into a principled, quantitative framework for actual causation
Albantakis et al./What caused what? 5
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Fig 1. Realization: dynamical causal network and transition. (A) A discrete dynamical
system constituted of 2 interacting elements: an OR- and AND-logic gate, which are updated
synchronously at every time step according to their input-output functions. Arrows denote
connections between the elements. (B) The same system can be represented as a dynami-
cal causal network over consecutive time steps. (C) The system described by its entire set
of transition probabilities. Since this particular system is deterministic all transitions have
a probability of either p = 0 or p = 1. (D) A realization of a system transient over two
time steps, consistent with the system’s transition probabilities: {(OR, AND)t−1 = 10} ≺
{(OR, AND)t = 10}.
that allows evaluating all actual causes and effects within a state transition of a
dynamical system of interacting elements, such as a biological or artificial neu-
ral network (Fig. 1). For maximal generality, we will formulate our account of
actual causation in the context of dynamical causal networks (Ay and Polani,
2008; Janzing et al., 2013; Biehl, Ikegami and Polani, 2016).
2.1. Dynamical Causal Networks
Our starting point is a dynamical causal network—a directed acyclic graph
(DAG) Gu = (V,E) with edges E that indicate the causal connections among
a set of nodes V and a given set of background conditions (state of exogenous
variables) U = u (Fig. 1B). The nodes in Gu represent a set of associated
random variables (which we also denote V ) with state space Ω and probability
function p(v|u), v ∈ Ω. For any node Vi ∈ V , we can define the parents of Vi in
Gu as all nodes with an edge leading into Vi,
pa(Vi) = {Vj | eji ∈ E}.
A causal network Gu is dynamical in the sense that we can define a partition
of its nodes V into k + 1 temporally ordered “slices” V = {V0, V1, . . . , Vk},
starting with an initial slice without parents (pa(V0) = ∅) and such that the
parents of each successive slice are fully contained within the previous slice
(pa(Vt) ⊆ Vt−1, t = 1, . . . , k). This definition is similar to one proposed in Ay
and Polani (2008), but is stricter, requiring that there are no within-slice causal
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interactions. This restriction prohibits any “instantaneous causation” between
variables (see also Pearl (2000), Section 1.5) and signifies that Gu fulfills the
Markov property. The parts of V = {V0, V1, . . . , Vk} can thus be interpreted as
consecutive time steps of a discrete dynamical system of interacting elements
(Fig. 1); a particular state V = v then corresponds to a realization of a system
transient over k + 1 time steps.
In a Bayesian network, the edges of Gu fully capture the dependency struc-
ture between nodes V . That is, for a given set of background conditions, each
node is conditionally independent of every other node given its parents in Gu,
and the probability function can be factored as
p(v | u) =
∏
i
p(vi | pa(vi), u), v ∈ Ω
For a causal network, there is the additional requirement that the edges E
capture causal dependencies (rather than merely correlations) between nodes.
This means that the decomposition of p(v | u) holds even if the parent vari-
ables are actively set into their state as opposed to passively observed in that
state (“Causal Markov Condition”, Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines (1993); Pearl
(2000)),
p(v | u) =
∏
i
p
(
vi | do(pa(vi), u)
)
, v ∈ Ω.
Because we assume here that U contains all relevant exogenous variables, any
statistical dependencies between Vt−1 and Vt are in fact causal dependencies,
and cannot be explained by latent external variables (“causal sufficiency”, see
Janzing et al. (2013)). Moreover, because time is explicit in Gu and we assume
that there is no instantaneous causation, there is no question of the direction
of causal influences—it must be that the earlier variables (Vt−1) influence the
later variables (Vt). By definition, Vt−1 contains all parents of Vt for t = 1, . . . , k.
Together, these assumptions imply a transition probability function for V such
that the nodes at time t are conditionally independent given the state of the
nodes at time t− 1 (Fig. 1C),
pu(vt | vt−1) = p(vt | vt−1, u)
=
∏
i
p
(
vi,t | vt−1, u
)
=
∏
i
p
(
vi,t | do(vt−1, u)
)
, ∀ (vt−1, vt) ∈ Ω.
(1)
To reiterate, a dynamical causal network Gu describes the causal interactions
among a set of nodes (the edges in E describe the causal connections between
the nodes in V ) conditional on the state of exogenous variables U , and the
transition probability function pu(vt | vt−1) (Eqn. 1) fully captures the nature
of these causal dependencies.
In sum, we assume that Gu fully and accurately describes the system of inter-
est for a given set of background conditions. In reality, a causal network reflects
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assumptions about a system’s elementary mechanisms. Current scientific knowl-
edge must inform which variables to include, what their relevant states are, and
how they are related mechanistically (Pearl, 2000, 2010). Here, we are primarily
interested in natural and artificial systems, such as neural networks, for which
detailed information about the causal network structure and the mechanisms
of individual system elements is often available, or can be obtained through
exhaustive experiments4. In such systems, counterfactuals can be evaluated by
performing experiments or simulations that assess how the system reacts to in-
terventions. Our objective here is to formulate a quantitative account of actual
causation applicable to any predetermined, dynamical causal network, indepen-
dent of practical considerations about model selection (Pearl, 2010; Halpern,
2016). Confounding issues due to incomplete knowledge, such as estimation bi-
ases of probabilities from finite sampling, or latent variables, are thus set aside
for the present purposes. To what extent and under which conditions the iden-
tified actual causes and effects generalize across possible levels of description,
or under incomplete knowledge, is an interesting question that we plan to ad-
dress in future work (see also Rubenstein et al. (2017); Marshall, Albantakis
and Tononi (2018)).
2.2. Occurrences and transitions
In general, actual causation can be evaluated over multiple time steps, e.g.,
considering indirect causal influences. Here, however, we specifically focus on
direct causes and effects without intermediary variables or time steps.5 For this
reason, we only consider causal networks containing nodes from two consecutive
time points, V = {Vt−1, Vt} and define a transition, denoted vt−1 ≺ vt, as a
realization V = v with v = (vt−1, vt) ∈ Ω (Fig. 1D).
Within a dynamical causal network Gu = (V,E) with V = {Vt−1, Vt}, our
objective is to determine the actual cause or actual effect of occurrences within
a transition vt−1 ≺ vt. Formally, an occurrence is defined to be a substate
Xt−1 = xt−1 ⊆ Vt−1 = vt−1 or Yt = yt ⊆ Vt = vt, corresponding to a subset of
elements at a particular time and in a particular state.
4The transition probabilities can, in principle, be determined, by perturbing the system
into all possible states while holding the exogenous variables fixed and observing the resulting
transitions. Alternatively, the causal network can be constructed by experimentally identifying
the input-output function of each element (its structural equation (Pearl, 2000; Janzing et al.,
2013)). Merely observing the system without experimental manipulation is insufficient to
identify causal relationships in most situations.
5Note that our approach generalizes, in principle, to system transitions across multiple time
steps by considering the transition probabilities pu(vt | vt−k) instead of pu(vt | vt−1) in Eqn. 1.
While this practice would correctly identify counterfactual dependencies between vt−k and vt,
it ignores the actual states of intermediate time steps (vt−k+1, . . . , vt−1). As a consequence,
the approach cannot, at present, address certain issues regarding causal transitivity across
multiple paths, incomplete causal processes in probabilistic causal networks (Schaffer, 2001),
or causal dependencies in non-Markovian systems.
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2.3. Cause and effect repertoires
Before defining the actual cause or actual effect of an occurrence, we first intro-
duce two definitions from IIT that are useful for characterizing the causal pow-
ers of occurrences in a causal network: cause/effect repertoires and partitioned
cause/effect repertoires. In IIT, a cause (or effect) repertoire is a conditional
probability distribution that describes how an occurrence (set of elements in a
state) constrains the potential past (or future) states of other elements in a sys-
tem (Oizumi, Albantakis and Tononi, 2014; Albantakis and Tononi, 2015), see
also (Tononi, 2015; Marshall, Gomez-Ramirez and Tononi, 2016) for a general
mathematical definition. In the present context of a transition vt−1 ≺ vt, an ef-
fect repertoire specifies how an occurrence xt−1 ⊆ vt−1 constrains the potential
future states of a set of nodes Yt ⊆ Vt. Likewise, a cause repertoire specifies
how an occurrence yt ⊆ vt constrains the potential past states of a set of nodes
Xt−1 ⊂ Vt−1 (Fig. 2).
The effect and cause repertoire can be derived from the system’s transition
probabilities (Eqn. 1) by conditioning on the state of the occurrence and causally
marginalizing the variables outside the occurrence Vt−1 \Xt−1 and Vt \ Yt (see
Discussion 4.1 and Fig. 13). Causal marginalization serves to remove any con-
tributions to the repertoire from variables outside the occurrence by averaging
over all their possible states. Explicitly, for a single node Yi,t the effect repertoire
is:
pi(Yi,t | xt−1) = 1|ΩW |
∑
w∈ΩW
pu (Yi,t | do (xt−1,W = w)) , (2)
where W = Vt−1 \ Xt−1 with state space ΩW . Note that for causal marginal-
ization, each possible state W = w ∈ ΩW is given the same weight |ΩW |−1 in
the average. This ensures that the repertoire captures the constraints due to the
occurrence per se, and not to whatever external factors might bias the variables
in W to one state or another (this is discussed in more detail in Section 4.1).
The complementary cause repertoire of a singleton occurrence yi,t, using
Bayes’ rule, is:
pi(Xt−1 | yi,t) =
∑
w∈ΩW
pu (yi,t | do (Xt−1,W = w))∑
z∈ΩVt−1 pu (yi,t | do (Vt−1 = z))
.
In the general case of a multi-variate Yt (or yt), the transition probability
function pu(Yt | xt−1) not only contains dependencies of Yt on xt−1, but also
correlations between variables in Yt due to common inputs from nodes inWt−1 =
Vt−1\Xt−1, which should not be counted as constraints due to xt−1. To discount
such correlations, we define the effect repertoire over a set of variables Yt as the
product of the effect repertoires over individual nodes6 (see also Janzing et al.
6In general, pi(Yt | xt−1) 6= p(Yt | xt−1). However, pi(Yt | xt−1) is equivalent to p(Yt | xt−1)
in the special case that all variables Yi,t ∈ Yt are conditionally independent given xt−1 (see
also Janzing et al. (2013), Remark 1). This is the case, for example, if Xt−1 already includes
all inputs (all parents) of Yt, or determines Yt completely.
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Fig 2. Assessing cause and effect repertoires. (A) Example effect repertoires indicating
how the occurrence {ORt−1 = 1} constrains the future states of ORt (left) and (OR,AND)t
(right) in the causal network shown in Fig. 1. (C) Example cause repertoires indicating how
the occurrences {ORt = 1} (left) and {(OR,AND)t = 10} (right) constrain the past states
of ORt−1. Throughout the manuscript, filled circles denote occurrences, while open circles
denote candidate causes and effects. Green shading is used for t, blue for t − 1. Nodes that
are not included in the occurrence or candidate cause/effect are causally marginalized.
(2013)):
pi(Yt | xt−1) =
∏
i
pi(Yi,t | xt−1). (3)
In the same manner, we define the cause repertoire of a general occurrence yt
over a set of variables Xt−1 as:
pi(Xt−1 | yt) =
∏
i pi(Xt−1 | yi,t)∑
x∈ΩXt−1
∏
i pi(Xt−1 = x | yi,t)
. (4)
We can also define unconstrained cause and effect repertoires, a special case
of cause or effect repertoires, where the occurrence that we condition on is the
empty set. In this case, the repertoire describes the causal constraints on a set
of the nodes due to the structure of the causal network, under maximum un-
certainty about the states of variables within the network. With the convention
that pi(∅) = 1, we can derive these unconstrained repertoires directly from the
formulas for the cause and effect repertoires, Eqn 3 and 4. The unconstrained
cause repertoire simplifies to a uniform distribution, representing the fact that
the causal network itself imposes no constraint on the possible states of variables
in Vt−1,
pi(Xt−1) = |ΩXt−1 |−1. (5)
The unconstrained effect repertoire is shaped by the update function of each
individual node Yi,t ∈ Yt under maximum uncertainty about the state of its
parents,
pi(Yt) =
∏
i
pi(Yi,t) =
∏
i
|ΩW |−1
∑
w∈ΩW
pu(Yi,t | do(W = w)), (6)
where W = Vt−1 \Xt−1 = Vt−1, since Xt−1 = ∅.
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Fig 3. Partitioning the repertoire pi(Yt | xt−1). (A) The set of all possible partitions of an
occurrence, Ψ(xt−1, Yt), includes all partitions of xt−1 into 2 ≤ m ≤ |xt−1| parts according to
Eqn. 7, as well as the special case ψ = {(xt−1,∅)}. Considering this special case a potential
partition has the added benefit that it allows us to treat singleton occurrences and multi-variate
occurrences in a common framework. (B) Except for the special case when the occurrence is
completely cut from the nodes it constrains, we generally do not consider cases with m = 1 as
partitions of the occurrence. The partition must eliminate the possibility of joint constraints
of xt−1 onto Yt. The set of all partitions Ψ(Xt−1, yt) of a cause repertoire pi(Xt−1 | yt)
includes all partitions of yt into 2 ≤ m ≤ |yt| parts according to Eqn. 9 and again the special
case of ψ = {(∅, yt)} for m = 1.
In summary, the effect and cause repertoires pi(Yt | xt−1) and pi(Xt−1 | yt),
respectively, are conditional probability distributions that specify the causal
constraints due to an occurrence on the potential past and future states of
variables in a causal network Gu. The cause and effect repertoires discount
constraints that are not specific to the occurrence of interest; possible constraints
due to the state of variables outside of the occurrence are causally marginalized
from the distribution, and constraints due to common inputs from other nodes
are avoided by treating each node in the occurrence independently.
An objective of IIT is to evaluate whether the causal constraints of an oc-
currence on a set of nodes are “integrated”, or “irreducible”, that is, whether
the individual variables in the occurrence work together to constrain the past
or future states of the set of nodes in a way that is not accounted for by the
variables taken independently (Balduzzi and Tononi, 2008; Oizumi, Albantakis
and Tononi, 2014). To this end, the occurrence (together with the set of nodes
it constrains) is partitioned into independent parts, by rendering the connection
between the parts causally ineffective (Balduzzi and Tononi, 2008; Janzing et al.,
2013; Oizumi, Albantakis and Tononi, 2014; Albantakis and Tononi, 2015). The
partitioned cause and effect repertoires describe the residual constraints under
the partition. Comparing the partitioned cause and effect repertoires to the in-
tact cause and effect repertoires reveals what is lost or changed by the partition.
A partition ψ of the occurrence xt−1 (and the nodes it constrains, Yt) into
m parts is defined as:
ψ(xt−1, Yt) = {(x1,t−1, Y1,t), (x2,t−1, Y2,t), . . . , (xm,t−1, Ym,t)}, (7)
such that {xj,t−1}mj=1 is a partition of xt−1 and Yj,t ⊆ Yt with Yj,t∩Yk,t = ∅, j 6=
k. Note that this includes the possibility that any Yj,t = ∅, which may leave
a set of nodes Yt \
⋃m
j=1 Yj,t completely unconstrained (see Fig. 3 for examples
and details).
The partitioned effect repertoire of an occurrence xt−1 over a set of nodes Yt
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under a partition ψ is defined as:
pi(Yt | xt−1)ψ =
m∏
j=1
pi(Yj,t | xj,t−1)× pi
Yt \ m⋃
j=1
Yj,t
 . (8)
It is the product of the corresponding m effect repertoires, multiplied by the
unconstrained effect repertoire of the remaining set of nodes Yt \
⋃m
j=1 Yj,t, as
these nodes are no longer constrained by any part of xt−1 under the partition.
In the same way, a partition ψ of the occurrence yt (and the nodes it con-
strains Xt−1) into m parts is defined as:
ψ(Xt−1, yt) = {(X1,t−1, y1,t), (X2,t−1, y2,t), . . . , (Xm,t−1, ym,t)}, (9)
such that {yi,t}mi=1 is a partition of yt and Xj,t−1 ⊆ Xt−1 with Xj,t−1∩Xk,t−1 =
∅, j 6= k. The partitioned cause repertoire of an occurrence yt over a set of nodes
Xt−1 under a partition ψ is defined as:
pi(Xt−1 | yt)ψ =
m∏
j=1
pi(Xj,t−1 | yj,t)× pi
Xt−1 \ m⋃
j=1
Xj,t−1
 . (10)
2.4. Actual causes and actual effects
The objective of this section is to introduce the notion of a causal account for
a transition of interest vt−1 ≺ vt in Gu as the set of all causal links between
occurrences within the transition. There is a causal link between occurrences
xt−1 and yt if yt is the actual effect of xt−1, or if xt−1 is the actual cause of yt.
Below, we define causal link, actual cause, actual effect, and causal account fol-
lowing five causal principles: realization, composition, information, integration,
and exclusion.
Realization. A transition vt−1 ≺ vt must be consistent with the transition
probability function of a dynamical causal network Gu,
pu(vt|vt−1) > 0.
Only occurrences within a transition vt−1 ≺ vt may have, or be, an actual cause
or actual effect.7 As a first example, we consider the transition {(OR,AND)t−1 =
10} ≺ {(OR,AND)t = 10} shown in Fig. 1D. The transition is consistent with
the conditional transition probabilities of the system shown in Fig. 1C.
Composition. Occurrences and their actual causes and effects can be uni-
or multi-variate. For a complete causal account of the transition vt−1 ≺ vt, all
causal links between occurrences xt−1 ⊆ vt−1 and yt ⊆ vt should be considered.
For this reason, we evaluate every subset of xt−1 ⊆ vt−1 as occurrences that
7This requirement corresponds to the first clause (“AC1”) of the Halpern and Pearl account
of actual causation (Halpern and Pearl, 2005; Halpern, 2015), that for C = c to be an actual
cause of E = e both must actually happen in the first place.
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Fig 4. Considering the power set of occurrences. All subsets xt−1 ⊆ vt−1 and yt ⊆ vt are
considered as occurrences that may have an actual effect or an actual cause.
may have actual effects and every subset yt ⊆ vt as occurrences that may have
actual causes (Fig. 4). For a particular occurrence xt−1, all subsets yt ⊆ vt
are considered as candidate effects (Fig. 5A). For a particular occurrence yt,
all subsets xt−1 ⊆ vt−1 are considered as candidate causes (Fig. 5B). In what
follows we refer to occurrences consisting of a single variable as “first-order”
occurrences and to multi-variate occurrences as “high-order” occurrences, and,
likewise, to “first-order” and “high-order” causes and effects.
In the example transition shown in Fig. 4, {ORt−1 = 1} and {ANDt = 0} are
first-order occurrences that could have an actual effect in vt, and {(OR, AND)t−1 =
10} is a high-order occurrence that could also have its own actual effect in
vt. On the other side, {ORt = 1}, {ANDt = 0} and {(OR, AND)t = 10}
are occurrences (two first-order and one high-order) that could have an ac-
tual cause in vt−1. To identify the respective actual cause (or effect) of any of
these occurrences, we evaluate all possible sets {OR = 1}, {AND = 0}, and
{(OR, AND) = 10} at time t − 1 (or t). Note that, in principle, we also con-
sider the empty set, again using the convention that pi(∅) = 1 (see “exclusion”
below).
Information. An occurrence must provide information about its actual cause
or effect. This means that it should increase the probability of its actual cause
or effect compared to its probability if the occurrence is unspecified. To evaluate
this, we compare the probability of a candidate effect yt in the effect repertoire
of the occurrence xt−1 (Eqn. 3) to its corresponding probability in the uncon-
strained repertoire (Eqn. 6). Specifically, we define an effect ratio ρe for the
occurrence xt−1 and a subsequent occurrence yt (the candidate effect) as:
ρe(xt−1, yt) = log2
(
pi(yt | xt−1)
pi(yt)
)
, (11)
In words, the effect ratio ρe is the relative increase in probability of an occur-
rence at t when constrained by an occurrence at t − 1, compared to when it
is unconstrained. A positive effect ratio ρe(xt−1, yt) > 0 means that the oc-
currence xt−1 makes a positive difference in bringing about yt. Similarly, we
compare the probability of a candidate cause xt−1 in the cause repertoire of
the occurrence yt (Eqn. 4) to its corresponding probability in the unconstrained
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repertoire (Eqn. 5). Thus, we define the cause ratio ρc for the occurrence yt and
a prior occurrence xt−1 (the candidate cause) as:
ρc(xt−1, yt) = log2
(
pi(xt−1 | yt)
pi(xt−1)
)
. (12)
In words, the cause ratio ρc is the relative increase in probability of an occur-
rence at t − 1 when constrained by an occurrence at t, compared to when it
is unconstrained. Note that the unconstrained repertoire (Eqn. 5 and 6) is an
average over all possible states of the occurrence. The cause and effect ratios
thus take all possible counterfactual states of the occurrence into account in
determining the strength of constraints.
Both ρe and ρc can be interpreted as the number of bits of information that
one occurrence specifies about the other (see Fano (1961), Chapter 2).8,9 Note
that ρe > 0 is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for yt to be an actual
effect of xt−1 and ρc > 0 is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for xt−1 to
be an actual cause of yt. ρc/e = 0 iff conditioning on the occurrence does not
change the probability of a potential cause or effect, which includes the case of
the empty set.
Occurrences xt−1 that lower the probability of a subsequent occurrence yt
have been termed “preventative causes” by some (Korb, Nyberg and Hope,
2011). Rather than counting a negative effect ratio ρe(xt−1, yt) < 0 as indicating
a possible “preventative effect”, we take the stance that such an occurrence xt−1
has no effect on yt, since it actually predicts other occurrences Yt = ¬yt that did
not happen. By the same logic, a negative cause ratio ρc(xt−1, yt) < 0 means that
xt−1 is no cause of yt within the transition. Nevertheless, the current framework
can in principle quantify the strength of possible “preventative” causes and
effects.
In Fig. 5A, for example, the occurrence {ORt−1 = 1} raises the probabil-
ity of {ORt = 1}, and vice versa (Fig. 5B), with ρe({ORt−1 = 1}, {ORt =
1}) = ρc({ORt = 1}, {ORt−1 = 1}) = 0.415 bits. By contrast, the occurrence
{ORt−1 = 1} lowers the probability of occurrence {ANDt = 0} and also of the
second-order occurrence {(OR, AND)t = 10} compared to their unconstrained
probabilities. Thus, neither {ANDt = 0} nor {(OR, AND)t = 10} can be ac-
tual effects of {ORt−1 = 1}. Likewise, the occurrence {ORt = 1} lowers the
probability of {ANDt−1 = 0}, which can thus not be its actual cause.
Integration. A high-order occurrence must specify more information about
its actual cause or effect than when its parts are considered independently. This
8In an information theoretic context, the formula log2 (p(x | y)/p(x)) is also known as the
“pointwise mutual information”. While the pointwise mutual information is symmetric, the
cause and effect ratios for an occurrence pair (xt−1, yt) are not always identical as they are
defined based on the product probabilities in Eqn. 3 and 4.
9In addition to the mutual information, ρe/c is also related to information theoretic di-
vergences that measure differences in probability distributions, such as the Kullback-Leibler
divergence, which would correspond to an average of log2 (p(x | y)/p(x)) over all states x ∈ ΩX
weighted by p(x | y). Here, we do not include any such weighting factor, since the transition
specifies which states actually occurred.
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Fig 5. Assessing cause and effect ratios (information), their irreducibility (integra-
tion), and the maximum cause/effect (exclusion). (A, B) Example effect and cause ratios.
The state that actually occurred is selected from the effect or cause repertoire (green is used
for effects, blue for causes). Its probability is compared to the probability of the same state
when unconstrained (overlaid distributions without fill). All repertoires are based on product
probabilities pi (Eqn. 3 and 4) that discount correlations due to common inputs when variables
are causally marginalized. For example, pi({(OR, AND)t = 01}) > 0 in (A, right panel), al-
though p({(OR, AND)t = 01}) = 0. (C, D) Irreducible effect and cause ratios. The probability
of the actual state in the effect or cause repertoire is compared against its probability in the
partitioned effect or cause repertoire (overlaid distributions without fill). Of all second-order
occurrences shown, only {(OR, AND)t = 10} irreducibly constrains {(OR, AND)t−1 = 10}.
For first-order occurrences αc/e = ρc/e (see text). Maximum values are highlighted in bold.
If, as in panel (B), a superset of a candidate cause or effect specifies the same maximum
value, it is excluded by a minimality condition.
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means that the high-order occurrence must increase the probability of its actual
cause or effect beyond the value specified by its parts.
As outlined in section 2.3, a partitioned cause or effect repertoire specifies the
residual constraints of an occurrence after applying a partition ψ. We quantify
the amount of information specified by the parts of an occurrence based on
partitioned cause/effect repertoires (Eqn. 8 and 10). We define the partitioned
effect ratio
ρe(xt−1, yt)ψ = log2
(
pi(yt | xt−1)ψ
pi(yt)
)
, (13)
and the partitioned cause ratio
ρc(xt−1, yt)ψ = log2
(
pi(xt−1 | yt)ψ
pi(xt−1)
)
. (14)
The information a high-order occurrence specifies about its actual cause or
effect is irreducible to the extent that it exceeds the information specified un-
der any partition ψ. Out of all permissible partitions Ψ(xt−1, Yt) (Eqn. 7), or
Ψ(Xt−1, yt) (Eqn. 9), the partition that least reduces an effect or cause ratio is
denoted the “minimum information partition” (MIP) (Oizumi, Albantakis and
Tononi, 2014; Albantakis and Tononi, 2015), respectively:
MIP = arg min
ψ∈Ψ(xt−1,Yt)
(ρe(xt−1, yt)− ρe(xt−1, yt)ψ)
or
MIP = arg min
ψ∈Ψ(Xt−1,yt)
(ρc(xt−1, yt)− ρc(xt−1, yt)ψ) .
We can then define the irreducible effect ratio αe as the difference between
the intact ratio and the ratio under the MIP:
αe(xt−1, yt) = ρe(xt−1, yt)− ρe(xt−1, yt)MIP = log2
(
pi(yt | xt−1)
pi(yt | xt−1)MIP
)
, (15)
and the irreducible cause ratio αc as:
αc(xt−1, yt) = ρc(xt−1, yt)− ρc(xt−1, yt)MIP = log2
(
pi(xt−1 | yt)
pi(xt−1 | yt)MIP
)
. (16)
For first-order occurrences xi,t−1 or yi,t−1 there is only one way to partition
the occurrence (ψ = {(xi,t−1,∅)} or ψ = {(yi,t,∅)}) which is necessarily the
MIP, leading to αe(xi,t−1, yt) = ρe(xi,t−1, yt) or αc(xt−1, yi,t) = ρc(xt−1, yi,t),
respectively.
A positive irreducible effect ratio (αe(xt−1, yt) > 0) signifies that the occur-
rence xt−1 has an irreducible effect on yt, which is necessary but not sufficient
for yt to be an actual effect of xt−1. Likewise, a positive irreducible cause ratio
(αc(xt−1, yt) > 0) means that yt has an irreducible cause in xt−1, which is a
necessary but not sufficient condition for xt−1 to be an actual cause of yt.
In our example transition, the occurrence {(OR, AND)t−1 = 10} (Fig. 5C) is
reducible. This is because {ORt−1 = 1} is sufficient to determine that {ORt = 1}
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with probability 1.0 and {ANDt−1 = 0} is sufficient to determine that {AND =
0} with probability 1.0. Thus, there is nothing to be gained by considering the
two nodes together as a second-order occurrence. By contrast, the occurrence
{(OR, AND)t = 10} determines the particular past state {(OR, AND)t−1 = 10}
with higher probability than the two first-order occurrences {ORt = 1} and
{ANDt = 0} taken separately (Fig. 5D, right). Thus, the second-order occur-
rence {(OR, AND)t = 10} is irreducible over the candidate cause {(OR, AND)t−1 =
10} with αc({(OR, AND)t−1 = 10}, {(OR, AND)t = 10}) = 0.17 bits (see Dis-
cussion 4.4).
Exclusion: An occurrence should have at most one actual cause and one
actual effect (which, however, can be multivariate, that is, a high-order occur-
rence). In other words, only one occurrence yt ⊆ vt can be the actual effect of an
occurrence xt−1, and only one occurrence xt−1 ⊆ vt−1 can be the actual cause
of an occurrence yt.
It is possible that there are multiple occurrences yt ⊆ vt over which xt−1 is
irreducible, αe(xt−1, yt) > 0, as well as multiple occurrences xt−1 ⊆ vt−1 over
which yt is irreducible, αc(xt−1, yt) > 0. The irreducible effect or cause ratio
of an occurrence quantifies the strength of its causal constraint on a candidate
effect or cause. When there are multiple candidate causes or effects for which
αc/e(xt−1, yt) > 0, we select the strongest of those constraints as its actual cause
or effect (that is, the one that maximizes α). Note that adding unconstrained
variables to a candidate cause (or effect) does not change the value of α, as the
occurrence still specifies the same irreducible constraints about the state of the
extended candidate cause (or effect). For this reason, we include a “minimality”
condition, such that no subset of an actual cause or effect should have the same
irreducible cause or effect ratio.10,11
We define the irreducibility of an occurrence as its maximum irreducible effect
(or cause) ratio over all candidate effects (or causes),
αmaxe (xt−1) = max
yt⊆vt
αe(xt−1, yt),
and
αmaxc (yt) = max
xt−1⊆vt−1
αc(xt−1, yt).
Considering the empty set as a possible cause or effect guarantees that the
minimal value that αmax can take is 0. Accordingly, if αmax = 0, then the
occurrence is said to be reducible, and it has is no actual cause or effect.
For the example in Fig. 2A, {ORt = 1} has two candidate causes with
αmaxc ({ORt = 1}) = 0.415 bits, the first-order occurrence {ORt−1 = 1} and
10The minimality condition between overlapping candidate causes or effects is related to
the third clause (“AC3”) in the various Halpern-Pearl accounts of actual causation (Halpern
and Pearl, 2005; Halpern, 2015), which states that no subset of an actual cause should also
satisfy the conditions for being an actual cause. See Supplementary Discussion.
11Under uncertainty about the causal model, or other practical considerations, the mini-
mality condition could, in principle, be replaced by a more elaborate criterion, similar to, e.g.,
the Akaike information criterion (AIC) that weighs increases in causal strength as measured
here against the number of variables included in the candidate cause or effect.
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the second-order occurrence {(OR, AND)t−1 = 10}. In this case, {ORt−1 = 1}
is the actual cause of {ORt = 1} by the minimality condition across overlapping
candidate causes.
The exclusion principle avoids causal overdetermination which arises from
counting multiple causes or effects for a single occurrence. Note, however, that
symmetries in Gu can give rise to genuine indeterminism about the actual cause
or effect (see Results 3). This is the case if multiple candidate causes (or effects)
are maximally irreducible and they are not simple sub- or supersets of each other.
Upholding the causal exclusion principle, such degenerate cases are resolved by
stipulating that the one actual cause remains undetermined between all minimal
candidate causes (or effects).
To summarize, we formally translate the five causal principles of IIT into the
following requirements for actual causation:
Realization There is a dynamical causal network Gu and a transition vt−1 ≺
vt, such that pu(vt|vt−1) > 0.
Composition All xt−1 ⊆ vt−1 may have actual effects and be actual causes
and all yt ⊆ vt may have actual causes and be actual effects.
Information Occurrences must increase the probability of their causes or ef-
fects (ρ(xt−1, yt) > 0).
Integration Moreover, they must do so above and beyond their parts (α(xt−1, yt) >
0).
Exclusion An occurrence has only one actual cause (or effect) and it is the
occurrence that maximizes αc (or αe).
Having established the above causal principles, we now formally define the
actual cause and the actual effect of an occurrence within a transition vt−1 ≺ vt
of the dynamical causal network Gu:
Definition 2.1. Within a transition vt−1 ≺ vt of a dynamical causal network
Gu, the actual cause of an occurrence yt ⊆ vt is an occurrence xt−1 ⊆ vt−1
which satisfies the following conditions:
1. The irreducible cause ratio of yt over xt−1 is maximal
αc(xt−1, yt) = αmax(yt)
2. No subset of xt−1 satisfies condition (1)
αc(x
′
t−1, yt) = α
max(yt)⇒ x′t−1 6⊂ xt−1
Define the set of all occurrences that satisfy the above conditions as x∗(yt).
Since an occurrence can have at most one actual cause, there are three potential
outcomes:
1. if x∗(yt) = {xt−1}, then xt−1 is the actual cause of yt;
2. if |x∗(yt)| > 1 then the actual cause of yt is indeterminate;
3. if x∗(yt) = {∅}, then yt has no actual cause.
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Definition 2.2. Within a transition vt−1 ≺ vt of a dynamical causal network
Gu, the actual effect of an occurrence xt−1 ⊆ vt−1 is an occurrence yt ⊆ vt
which satisfies the following conditions:
1. The irreducible effect ratio of xt−1 over yt is maximal
αe(xt−1, yt) = αmax(xt−1)
2. No subset of yt satisfies condition (1)
αe(xt−1, y′t) = α
max(xt−1)⇒ y′t 6⊂ yt
Define the set of all occurrences that satisfy the above conditions as y∗(xt−1).
Since an occurrence can have at most one actual effect, there are three potential
outcomes:
1. if y∗(xt−1) = {yt}, then yt is the actual effect of xt−1;
2. if |y∗(xt−1)| > 1 then the actual effect of xt−1 is indeterminate;
3. if y∗(xt−1) = {∅}, then xt−1 has no actual effect.
Based on Definitions 2.1 and 2.2:
Definition 2.3. Within a transition vt−1 ≺ vt of a dynamical causal network
Gu, a causal link is an occurrence xt−1 ⊆ vt−1 with αmaxe (xt−1) > 0 and its
actual effect y∗(xt−1),
xt−1 → y∗(xt−1),
or an occurrence yt ⊆ vt with αmaxc (yt) > 0 and its actual cause x∗(yt),
x∗(yt)← yt
An irreducible occurrence defines a single causal link, regardless of whether
the actual cause (or effect) is unique or indeterminate. When the actual cause
(or effect) is unique, we sometimes refer to the actual cause (or effect) explicitly
in the causal link, xt−1 ← yt (or xt−1 → yt). The strength of a causal link is
determined by its αmaxe or α
max
c value. Reducible occurrences (α
max = 0) cannot
form a causal link.
Definition 2.4. For a transition vt−1 ≺ vt of a dynamical causal network Gu,
the causal account C(vt−1 ≺ vt) is the set of all causal links xt−1 → y∗(xt−1)
and x∗(yt)← yt within the transition.
Under this definition, all actual causes and actual effects contribute to the
causal account C(vt−1 ≺ vt). Notably, the fact that there is a causal link xt−1 →
yt does not necessarily imply that the reverse causal link xt−1 ← yt is also
present, and vice versa. In other words, just because yt is the actual effect
of xt−1, the occurrence xt−1 does not have to be the actual cause of yt. It is
therefore not redundant to include both directions in C(vt−1 ≺ vt), as illustrated
by examples of overdetermination and prevention in the Results section (see also
Discussion 4.2).
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Fig 6. Causal Account. There are two first-order occurrences with actual effects and actual
causes. In addition, the second-order occurrence {(OR, AND)t = 10} has an actual cause
{(OR, AND)t−1 = 10}.
Fig. 6 shows the entire causal account of our example transition. Intuitively,
in this simple example, {ORt−1 = 1} has the actual effect {ORt = 1} and
is also the actual cause of {ORt = 1}, and the same for {ANDt−1 = 0} and
{AND = 0}. Nevertheless, there is also a causal link between the second-order
occurrence {(OR, AND)t = 10} and its actual cause {(OR, AND)t−1 = 10},
which is irreducible to its parts, as shown in Fig. 5D (right). However, there is
no complementary link from {(OR, AND)t = 10} to {(OR, AND)t−1 = 10}, as
it is reducible (Fig. 5C, right). The causal account shown in Fig. 6 provides a
complete causal explanation for “what happened” and “what caused what” in
the transition {(OR, AND)t−1 = 10} ≺ {(OR, AND)t = 10}.
Similar to the notion of system-level integration in IIT (Oizumi, Albantakis
and Tononi, 2014; Albantakis and Tononi, 2015), the principle of integration can
also be applied to the causal account as a whole, not only to individual causal
links (see Supplementary Methods). In this way it is possible to evaluate to what
extent the transition vt−1 ≺ vt is irreducible to its parts, which is quantified by
A(vt−1 ≺ vt).
In summary, the measures defined in this section provide the means to ex-
haustively assess “what caused what” in a transition vt−1 ≺ vt, and to evaluate
the strength of specific causal links of interest under a particular set of back-
ground conditions, U = u.
Software to analyze transitions in dynamical causal networks with binary
variables is freely available within the “PyPhi” toolbox for integrated informa-
tion theory (Mayner et al., 2018) at https://github.com/wmayner/pyphi, in-
cluding documentation at https://pyphi.readthedocs.io/en/stable/examples/
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actual_causation.html.
3. Results
In the following, we will present a series of examples to illustrate the quantities
and objects defined in the theory section and address several dilemmas taken
from the literature on actual causation. For simplicity, we only cover exam-
ples including binary variables in the main text. Multi-variate examples which
demonstrate that our proposed framework for actual causation naturally gen-
eralizes beyond the binary case can be found in the Supplementary Discussion.
There, we also discuss in detail how our approach and the results below com-
pare to counterfactual accounts of actual causation based on “contingency con-
ditions” (Hitchcock, 2001; Halpern and Pearl, 2001; Woodward, 2003; Halpern
and Pearl, 2005; Halpern, 2015; Weslake, 2015)12.
3.1. Same transition, different mechanism: disjunction,
conjunction, biconditional, and prevention
Fig. 7 shows 4 causal networks of different types of logic gates with two inputs
each, all transitioning from the input state vt−1 = {AB = 11} to the output
state vt = {C = 1}, {D = 1}, {E = 1} or {F = 1}. From a dynamical point of
view, without taking the causal structure of the mechanisms into account, the
same occurrences happen in all four situations. However, analyzing the causal ac-
counts of these transitions reveals differences in the number, type, and strength
of causal links between occurrences and their actual causes or effects.
Disjunction: The first example (Fig. 7A – OR-gate), is a case of symmetric
overdetermination (Pearl (2000), Chapter 10): each input to C would have been
sufficient for {C = 1}, yet both {A = 1} and {B = 1} occurred at t − 1. In
this case, each of the inputs to C has an actual effect, {A = 1} → {C = 1} and
{B = 1} → {C = 1}, as they raise the probability of {C = 1} compared to its
unconstrained probability. The high-order occurrence {AB = 11}, however, is
reducible with αe = 0. While both {A = 1} and {B = 1} have actual effects,
by the causal exclusion principle, the occurrence {C = 1} can only have one
actual cause. Since both {A = 1} ← {C = 1} and {B = 1} ← {C = 1} have
αc = α
max
c = 0.415 bits, by Definition 2.1, the actual cause of {C = 1} is either
{A = 1}, or {B = 1}; which of the two inputs it is remains undetermined, since
they are perfectly symmetric in this example. Note that {AB = 11} ← {C = 1}
also has αc = 0.415 bits, but {AB = 11} is excluded from being a cause by the
minimality condition.
Conjunction: In the second example (Fig. 7B – AND-gate), both {A = 1}
and {B = 1} are necessary for {D = 1}. In this case, each input alone has
12While indeterminism may play a fundamental role in physical causal models, the existing
literature on actual causation largely focuses on deterministic problem cases. For ease of com-
parison, most causal networks analyzed in the following are thus deterministic, corresponding
to prominent test cases.
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an actual effect, {A = 1} → {C = 1} and {B = 1} → {C = 1} (with higher
strength than in the disjunctive case), but here also the second-order occurrence
of both inputs together has an actual effect, {AB = 11} → {D = 1}. Thus,
there is a composition of actual effects. Again, the occurrence {D = 1} can only
have one actual cause; here it is the second-order cause {AB = 11}, the only
occurrence that satisfies the conditions in Definition 2.1 with αc = α
max
c = 2.0.
The two examples in Fig. 7A and B are often referred to as the disjunctive
and conjunctive versions of the “forest-fire” example (Halpern and Pearl, 2005;
Halpern, 2015, 2016), where lightning and/or a match being dropped result in a
forest fire. In the case that lightning strikes and the match is dropped, {A = 1}
and {B = 1} are typically considered two separate (first-order) causes in both
the disjunctive and conjunctive version (e.g., Halpern and Pearl (2005), see Sup-
plementary Discussion). This result is not a valid solution within our proposed
account of actual causation, as it violates the causal exclusion principle. We ex-
plicitly evaluate the high-order occurrence {AB = 11} as a candidate cause, in
addition to {A = 1} and {B = 1}. In line with the distinct logic structure of the
two examples, we identify the high-order occurrence {AB = 11} as the actual
cause of {D = 1} in the conjunctive case, while we identify either {A = 1} or
{B = 1} as the actual cause of {C = 1} in the disjunctive case, but not both. By
separating actual causes from actual effects, acknowledging causal composition,
and respecting the causal exclusion principle, our proposed causal analysis can
illuminate and distinguish all situations displayed in Fig. 7.
Biconditional: The significance of high-order occurrences is further empha-
sized by the third example (Fig. 7C), where E is a “logical biconditional” (an
XNOR) of its two inputs. In this case, the individual occurrences {A = 1} and
{B = 1} by themselves make no difference in bringing about {E = 1}; their
effect ratios are zero. For this reason, they cannot have actual effects and can-
not be actual causes. Only the second-order occurrence {AB = 11} specifies
{E = 1}, which is its actual effect {AB = 11} → {E = 1}. Likewise, {E = 1}
only specifies the second-order occurrence {AB = 11}, which is its actual cause
{AB = 11} ← {E = 1}, but not its parts taken separately. Note that the causal
strength in this example is lower than in the case of the AND-gate, since, ev-
erything else being equal, {D = 1} is mechanistically a less likely output than
{E = 1}.
Prevention: In the final example, Fig. 7D, all input states but {AB = 10}
lead to {F = 1}. Here, {B = 1} → {F = 1} and {B = 1} ← {F = 1}, whereas
{A = 1} does not have an actual effect and is not an actual cause. For this
reason, the transition vt−1 ≺ vt is reducible (A(vt−1 ≺ vt) = 0, Supplementary
Methods), since A could be partitioned away without loss. This example can
be seen as a case of prevention: {B = 1} causes {F = 1}, which prevents any
effect of {A = 1}. In a popular narrative accompanying this example, {A = 1}
is an assassin putting poison in the King’s tea, while a bodyguard administers
an antidote {B = 1}, and the King survives {F = 1} (Halpern, 2016). The
bodyguard thus “prevents” the King’s death13. Note that the causal account
13Note however that this causal model is equivalent to an OR-gate, as can be seen by
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Fig 7. Four dynamically identical transitions can have different causal accounts. Shown
are the transitions (top) and their respective causal accounts (bottom).
is state dependent: for a different transition, A may have an actual effect or
contribute to an actual cause: if the bodyguard does not administer the antidote
({B = 0}), whether the King survives depends on the assassin (the state of A).
Taken together, the above examples demonstrate that the causal account and
the causal strength of individual causal links within the account capture differ-
ences in sufficiency and necessity of the various occurrences in their respective
transitions. Including both actual causes and effects moreover contributes to a
mechanistic understanding of the transition, since not all occurrences at t − 1
with actual effects end up being actual causes of occurrences at t.
3.2. Linear threshold units
A generalization of simple, linear logic gates, such as OR- and AND-gates,
are binary linear threshold units (LTUs). Given n equivalent inputs Vt−1 =
{V1,t−1, V2,t−1, . . . , Vn,t−1} to a single LTU Vt, Vt will turn on (‘1’) if the number
of inputs in state ‘1’ exceeds a given threshold k,
p(Vt = 1 | vt−1) =
{
1 if
∑n
i=1 vi,t−1 ≥ k,
0 if
∑n
i=1 vi,t−1 < k.
(17)
LTUs are of great interest, for example, in the field of neural networks, since
they comprise one of the simplest model mechanisms for neurons, capturing the
notion that a neuron fires if it received sufficient synaptic inputs. One example
is a Majority-gate, which outputs ‘1’ iff more than half of its inputs are ‘1’.
Fig. 8A displays the causal account of a Majority-gate M with 4 inputs
for the transition vt−1 = {ABCD = 1110} → vt = {M = 1}. All of the
inputs in state ‘1’, as well as their high-order occurrences, have actual effects on
{M = 1}. Occurrence {D = 0}, however, does not work towards bringing about
{M = 1}: it reduces the probability for {M = 1} and thus does not contribute
to any actual effects or the actual cause. As with the AND-gate in the previous
switching the state labels of A from ‘0’ to ‘1’ and vice versa. The discussed transition would
correspond to the case of one input to the OR-gate being ‘1’ and the other ‘0’. Since the
OR-gate switches on (‘1’) in this case, the ‘0’ input has no effect and is not a cause.
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Fig 8. A linear threshold unit with four inputs and threshold k = 3 (Majority gate).
(A) All inputs are considered relevant variables. (B) D = 0 is taken as a fixed background
condition (indicated by the red pin).
section, there is a composition of actual effects in the causal account. Yet, there
is only one actual cause, {ABC = 111} ← {M = 1}. In this case, it happens
to be that the third-order occurrence {ABC = 111} is minimally sufficient for
{M = 1}—no smaller set of inputs would suffice. Note however, that the actual
cause is not determined based on sufficiency, but because {ABC = 111} is the
set of nodes maximally constrained by the occurrence {M = 1}. Nevertheless,
causal analysis as illustrated here will always identify a minimally sufficient set
of inputs as the actual cause of an LTU vt = 1, for any number of inputs n and
any threshold k. Furthermore, any occurrence of input variables xt−1 ⊆ vt−1
with at most k nodes, all in state ‘1’, will be irreducible, with the LTU vt = 1
as their actual effect.
Theorem 3.1. Consider a dynamical causal network Gu such that Vt = {Yt}
is a linear threshold unit with n inputs and threshold k ≤ n, and Vt−1 is the set
of n inputs to Yt. For a transition vt−1 ≺ vt, with yt = 1 and
∑
vt−1 ≥ k, the
following holds:
1. The actual cause of {Yt = 1} is an occurrence {Xt−1 = xt−1} with |xt−1| =
k and min(xt−1) = 1.
2. If min(xt−1) = 1 and |xt−1| ≤ k then the actual effect of {Xt−1 = xt−1}
is {Yt = 1}; otherwise {Xt−1 = xt−1} has no actual effect, it is reducible.
Proof: See Supplementary Proofs.
Note that an LTU in the off (‘0’) state, {Yt = 0}, has equivalent results
with the role of ‘0’ and ‘1’ reversed, and a threshold of n − k. In the case of
overdetermination, e.g., the transition vt−1 = {ABCD = 1111} ≺ vt = {M =
1}, where all inputs to the Majority-gate are ‘1’, the actual cause will again be a
subset of 3 input nodes in state ‘1’. However, which of the possible sets remains
undetermined due to symmetry, just as in the case of the OR-gate in Fig. 7A.
3.3. Distinct background conditions
The causal network in Fig. 8A considers all inputs to M as relevant variables.
Under certain circumstance, however, we may want to consider a different set
of background conditions. For example, in a voting scenario it may be a given
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that D always votes “no” (D = 0). In that case we may want to analyze the
causal account of the transition vt−1 = {ABC = 111} ≺ vt = {M = 1} in
the alternative causal model Gu′ , where {D = 0} ∈ {U ′ = u′} is treated as a
background condition (Fig. 8B). Doing so results in a causal account with the
same causal links but higher causal strengths. This captures the intuition that
A, B, and C’s “yes votes” are more important if it is already determined that
D will vote “no”.
The difference between the causal accounts of vt−1 ≺ vt in Gu compared to
Gu′ , moreover, highlights the fact that we explicitly distinguish fixed background
conditions U = u from relevant variables V whose counterfactual relations must
be considered (see also McDermott (2002)). While the background variables
are fixed in their actual state U = u, all counterfactual states of the relevant
variables V are considered when evaluating the causal account of vt−1 ≺ vt in
Gu.
3.4. Disjunction of conjunctions
Another case often considered in the actual causation literature is a disjunction
of conjunctions, that is, an OR-operation over two or more AND-operations.
In the general case, a disjunction of conjunctions is a variable Vt that is a
disjunction of k conditions, each of which is a conjunction of nj input nodes
Vt−1 = {{Vi,j,t−1}nji=1}kj=1,
p(Vt = 1 | vt−1) =
{
0 if
∑nj
i=1 vi,j,t−1 < nj , ∀j
1 otherwise
Here we consider a simple example, (A ∧ B) ∨ C (Fig. 9). The debate over
this example is mostly concerned with the type of transition shown in Fig. 9A:
vt−1 = {ABC = 101} ≺ vt = {D = 1}, and the question whether {A = 1} is a
cause of {D = 1} even if B = 0.14
The quantitative assessment of actual causes and actual effects can help to
resolve issues of actual causation in this type of example. As shown in Fig.
9A, with respect to actual effects, both causal links {A = 1} → {D = 1} and
{C = 1} → {D = 1} are present, with {C = 1} having a stronger actual effect.
However, {C = 1} is the one actual cause of {D = 1}, being the maximally
irreducible cause with αmaxc ({D = 1}) = 0.678.
When judging the actual effect of {A = 1} at t − 1 within the transition
vt−1 = {ABC = 101} ≺ vt = {D = 1}, B is assumed to be undetermined. By
itself, the occurrence {A = 1} does raise the probability of occurrence {D = 1},
and thus {A = 1} → {D = 1}.
If we instead consider {B = 0} ∈ {U ′ = u′} as a fixed background condition
and evaluate the transition vt−1 = {AC = 11} ≺ vt = {D = 1} in Gu′ , {A = 1}
14One story accompanying this example is that “a prisoner dies either if A loads B’s gun
and B shoots, or if C loads and shoots his gun, . . . A loads B’s gun, B does not shoot, but
C does load and shoot his gun, so that the prisoner dies” (Hopkins and Pearl, 2003; Halpern,
2016).
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Fig 9. Disjunction of two conjunctions (A ∧ B) ∨ C. (A) All inputs to D are considered
relevant variables. (B) B = 0 is taken as a fixed background condition.
does not have an actual effect anymore (Fig. 9B). In this case, the background
condition {B = 0} prevents {A = 1} from having any effect.
The results from this example extend to the general case of disjunctions of
conjunctions. In the situation where vt = 1, the actual cause of vt is a mini-
mally sufficient occurrence. If multiple conjunctive conditions are satisfied, the
actual cause of vt remains indetermined between all minimally sufficient sets
(asymmetric overdetermination). At t − 1, any first-order occurrence in state
‘1’, as well as any high-order occurrence of such nodes that does not overdeter-
mine vt, has an actual effect. This includes any occurrence in state all ‘1’ that
contains only variables from exactly one conjunction, as well as any high-order
occurrence of nodes across conjunctions, which do not fully contain any specific
conjunction.
If instead vt = 0, then its actual cause is an occurrence that contains a single
node in state ‘0’ from each conjunctive condition. At t − 1, any occurrence in
state all ‘0’ that does not overdetermine vt has an actual effect, which is any all
‘0’ occurrence that does not contain more than one node from any conjunction.
These results are formalized by the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2. Consider a dynamical causal network Gu such that Vt = {Yt}
is a DOC element that is a disjunction of k conditions, each of which is a
conjunction of nj inputs, and Vt−1 = {{Vi,j,t−1}nji=1}kj=1 is the set of its n =∑
j nj inputs. For a transition vt−1 ≺ vt, the following holds:
1. If yt = 1,
(a) The actual cause of {Yt = 1} is an occurrence {Xt−1 = xt−1} where
xt−1 = {xi,j,t−1}nji=1 ⊆ vt−1 such that min(xt−1) = 1.
(b) The actual effect of {Xt−1 = xt−1} is {Yt = 1} if min(xt−1) = 1 and
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Fig 10. Complicated voting.
|xt−1| = cj = nj; otherwise xt−1 is reducible.
2. If yt = 0,
(a) The actual cause of {Yt = 0} is an occurrence xt−1 ⊆ vt−1 such that
max(xt−1) = 0 and cj = 1 ∀ j.
(b) If max(xt−1) = 0 and cj ≤ 1 ∀ j then the actual effect of {Xt−1 =
xt−1} is {Yt = 0}; otherwise xt−1 is reducible.
Proof: See Supplementary Proofs.
3.5. Complicated voting
As already demonstrated in the examples in Fig. 7C and D, the proposed causal
analysis is not restricted to linear update functions or combinations thereof.
Fig. 10 depicts an example transition featuring a complicated, nonlinear update
function. This specific example is taken from (Halpern, 2015, 2016): If A and B
agree, F takes their value, if B, C, D, and E agree, F takes A’s value, otherwise
majority decides. The transition of interest is vt−1 = {ABCDE = 11000} ≺
vt = {F = 1}.
According to Halpern (2015), intuition suggests that {A = 1} together with
{B = 1} cause {F = 1}. Indeed, {AB = 11} is one minimally sufficient occur-
rence in the transition that determines {F = 1}. The result of the present causal
analysis of the transition (Fig. 10) is that both {AB = 11} and {ACDE = 1000}
completely determine that {F = 1} will occur with αc(xt−1, yt) = αmaxc (yt) =
1.0. Thus, there is indeterminism between these two causes (see Supplementary
Discussion for a comparison of our results with those of Halpern (2015)). In
addition, the effects {A = 1} → {F = 1}, {B = 1} → {F = 1}, {AB = 11} →
{F = 1}, and {ACDE = 1000} → {F = 1} all contribute to the causal account.
3.6. Noise and probabilistic variables
The examples so far involved deterministic update functions. Probabilistic ac-
counts of causation are closely related to counterfactual accounts (Paul and
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Hall, 2013). Nevertheless, certain problem cases only arise in probabilistic set-
tings (e.g. Fig. 11B). The present causal analysis can be applied equally to prob-
abilistic and deterministic causal networks, as long as the system’s transition
probabilities satisfy conditional independence (Eqn. 1). No separate, probabilis-
tic calculus for actual causation is required.
In the simplest case, where noise is added to a deterministic transition vt−1 ≺
vt, the noise will generally decrease the strength of the causal links in the
transition. Fig. 11 shows the causal account of the transition vt−1 = {A =
1} ≺ vt = {N = 1}, where N is the slightly noisy version of a COPY-gate.
In this example, both {A = 1} → {N = 1} and {A = 1} ← {N = 1}.
The only difference with the equivalent deterministic case is that the causal
strength αmaxe = α
max
c = 0.848 is lower than in the deterministic case where
αmaxe = α
max
c = 1. Note that in this probabilistic setting, the actual cause
{A = 1} by itself is not sufficient to determine {N = 1}. Nevertheless, {A = 1}
makes a positive difference in bringing about {N = 1}, and this difference is
irreducible, so the causal link is present within the transition.
The transition vt−1 = {A = 1} ≺ vt = {N = 0} has no counterpart in the
deterministic case where p({N = 0}|{A = 1}) = 0 (considering the transition
would thus violate the realization principle). The result of the causal analysis
is that there are no irreducible causal links within this transition. {A = 1}
decreases the probability of {N = 0} and vice versa, which leads to αc/e < 0.
Consequently, αmaxc/e = 0, as specified by the empty set. One interpretation is that
the actual cause of {N = 0} must lie outside of the system, such as a missing
latent variable. Another interpretation is that the actual cause for {N = 0} is
genuine ‘physical noise’, for example, within an element or connection. In any
case, the proposed account of actual causation is sufficiently general to cover
both deterministic as well as probabilistic systems.
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3.7. Simple classifier
As a final example, we consider a transition with a multi-variate vt: the 3 vari-
ables A, B, and C provide input to 3 different “detectors”, the nodes D, S, and
L. D is a “dot-detector”; it outputs ‘1’ if exactly one of the 3 inputs is in state
‘1’. S is a “segment-detector”: it outputs ‘1’ for input states {ABC = 110} and
{ABC = 011}. L detects lines, that is, {ABC = 111}.
Fig. 12 shows the causal account of the specific transition vt−1 = {ABC =
001} ≺ vt = {DSL = 100}. In this case, only a few occurrences xt−1 ⊆ vt−1
have actual effects, but all possible occurrences yt ⊆ vt are irreducible with their
own actual cause. The occurrence {C = 1} by itself, for example, has no actual
effect. This may be initially surprising since D is a dot detector and {C = 1}
is supposedly a dot. However, {C = 1} by itself does not raise the probability
of {D = 1}. The specific configuration of the entire input set is necessary to
determine {D = 1} (a dot is only a dot if the other inputs are ‘0’). Consequently,
{ABC = 001} → {D = 1} and also {ABC = 001} ← {D = 1}. By contrast, the
occurrence {A = 0} is sufficient to determine {L = 0} and raises the probability
of {D = 1}; the occurrence {B = 0} is sufficient to determine {S = 0} and
{L = 0} and also raises the probability of {D = 1}. We thus get the following
causal links: {A = 0} → {DL = 10}, {{A = 0}, {B = 0}} ← {L = 0},
{B = 0} → {DSL = 100} and {B = 0} ← {S = 0}.
In addition, all high-order occurrences yt are irreducible, each having their
own actual cause above those of their parts. The actual cause identified for
these high-order occurrences can be interpreted as the “strongest” shared cause
of nodes in the occurrence, for example {B = 0} ← {DS = 10}. While only the
occurrence {ABC = 001} is sufficient to determine {DS = 10}, this candidate
causal link is reducible, because {DS = 10} does not constrain the past state of
ABC any more than {D = 1} by itself. In fact, the occurrence {S = 0} does not
constrain the past state of AC at all. Thus {ABC = 001} and all other candidate
causes of {DS = 10} that include these nodes are either reducible (because their
causal link can be partitioned with αmaxc = 0) or excluded (because there is a
subset of nodes whose causal strength is at least as high). In this example,
{B = 0} is the only irreducible shared cause of {D = 1} and {S = 0}, and thus
also the actual cause of {DS = 10}.
4. Discussion
In this article, we presented a principled, comprehensive formalism to assess
actual causation within a given dynamical causal network Gu. For a transition
vt−1 ≺ vt in Gu, the proposed framework provides a complete causal account
of all causal links between occurrences at t − 1 and t of the transition, based
on five principles—realization, composition, information, integration, and exclu-
sion. In what follows, we review specific features and limitations of our approach,
discuss how the results relate to intuitive notions about actual causation and
causal explanation, and highlight some of the main differences with previous
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Fig 12. Simple classifier. D is a “dot-detector”, S a “segment-detector”, and L a “line-
detector” (see text).
proposals aimed at operationalizing the notion of actual causation. Specifically,
our framework considers all counterfactual states rather than a single contin-
gency, which makes it possible to assess the strength of causal links. Second,
it distinguishes between actual causes and actual effects, which are considered
separately. Third, it allows for causal composition, in the sense that first- and
high-order occurrences can have their own causes and effects within the same
transition, as long as they are irreducible. And fourth, it provides a rigorous
treatment of causal overdetermination. As demonstrated in the results section
and the Supplementary Discussion, the proposed formalism is generally applica-
ble to a vast range of physical systems, whether deterministic or probabilistic,
with binary or multi-valued variables, feedforward or recurrent architectures,
as well as narrative examples, as long as they can be represented as a causal
network with an explicit temporal order.
4.1. Testing all possible counterfactuals with equal probability
In the simplest case, counterfactual approaches to actual causation are based
on the “but-for” test (Halpern, 2016): C = c is a cause of E = e if C = ¬c
implies E = ¬e (“but for c, e would not have happened”). In multi-variate
causal networks this condition is typically dependent on the remaining variables
W . What differs among current counterfactual approaches are the permissible
contingencies (W = w) under which the “but-for” test is applied (e.g., Hitchcock
(2001); Yablo (2002); Woodward (2003); Halpern and Pearl (2005); Hall (2007);
Halpern (2015); Weslake (2015)) (see Supplementary Discussion). Moreover, if
there is one permissible contingency (counterfactual state) {¬c, w} that implies
E = ¬e, c is identified as a cause of e in an “all-or-nothing” manner. In sum,
current approaches test for counterfactual dependence under a fixed contingency
W = w, evaluating a particular counterfactual state C = ¬c.
Our starting point is a realization of a dynamical causal network Gu, which
is a transition vt−1 ≺ vt that is compatible with Gu’s transition probabilities
(pu(vt|vt−1) > 0) given the fixed background conditions U = u (Fig. 13A).
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Fig 13. Causal conditioning and marginalizing. (A) Variables outside the transition of
interest are treated as fixed background conditions (indicated by the red pins). The transition
probabilities p(vt|vt−1) are conditioned on the state of these exogenous variables. (B) When
evaluating the strength of a causal link within the transition, the remaining variables in Gu
but outside the causal link are causally marginalized, i.e., replaced by an average across all
their possible states. With B marginalized, the state of A by itself does not determine and is
not determined by the occurrence {XOR = 1}.
Albantakis et al./What caused what? 31
However, we employ causal marginalization instead of fixed W = w and C = ¬c
within the transition. This means that we replace these variables with an average
over all their possible states (Eqn. 2).
Applied to variables outside of the candidate causal link (Fig. 13B), causal
marginalization serves to remove the influence of these variables on the causal
dependency between the occurrence and its candidate cause (or effect), which
is thus evaluated based on its own merits. The difference between marginaliz-
ing the variables outside the causal link of interest and treating them as fixed
contingencies becomes apparent in the case of an XOR (“exclusive OR”) mecha-
nism in Fig. 13 (or equivalently the biconditional (XNOR), Fig. 7C). With input
B fixed in a particular state (‘0’ or ‘1’) the state of the XOR will completely
depend on the state of A. However, the state of A alone does not determine
the state of the XOR at all if B is marginalized. The latter better captures the
mechanistic nature of the XOR, which requires a difference in A and B to switch
on (‘1’).
We also marginalize across all possible states of C in order to determine
whether e counterfactually depends on c. Instead of identifying one particular
C = ¬c for which E = ¬e, all of C’s states are equally taken into account. The
notion that counterfactual dependence is an “all-or-nothing concept” (Halpern,
2016) becomes problematic, for example, if non-binary variables are considered
(see Supplementary Discussion) and also in non-deterministic settings. By con-
trast, our proposed approach, that considers all possible states of C, naturally
extends to the case of multi-valued variables and probabilistic causal networks.
Moreover, it has the additional benefit that we can quantify the strength of the
causal link between an occurrence and its actual cause (effect). In the present
framework, having a positive effect ratio ρe(xt−1, yt) > 0 is necessary but not
sufficient for xt−1 → yt, and the same for a positive cause ratio ρc(xt−1, yt) > 0.
Taken together, we argue that causal marginalization, that is, averaging over
contingencies and all possible counterfactuals of an occurrence, reveals the mech-
anisms underlying the transition. By contrast, fixing relevant variables to any
one specific state largely ignores them. This is because a mechanism is only fully
described by all its transition probabilities, for all possible input states (Eqn. 1).
For example, the biconditional E in Fig. 7C, only differs from the conjunction
D in Fig. 7B, for the input state AB = 00. Once the underlying mechanisms are
specified based on all possible transition probabilities, causal interactions can
be quantified in probabilistic terms (Ay and Polani, 2008; Oizumi, Albantakis
and Tononi, 2014) even within a single transition vt−1 ≺ vt, i.e. in the context
of actual causation (Glennan, 2011; Korb, Nyberg and Hope, 2011). However,
this also means that all transition probabilities have to be known for the pro-
posed causal analysis, even for states that are not typically observed (see also Ay
and Polani (2008); Balduzzi and Tononi (2008); Janzing et al. (2013); Oizumi,
Albantakis and Tononi (2014)).
Finally, in our analysis all possible past states are weighted equally in the
causal marginalization. Related measures of information flow in causal networks
(Ay and Polani, 2008) and causal information (Korb, Nyberg and Hope, 2011)
consider weights based on a distribution of p(vt−1), for example, the stationary
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distribution, or observed probabilities, or also a maximum entropy distribution
(equivalent to weighting all states equally). However, in the context of actual
causation, the prior probabilities of occurrences at t − 1 are extraneous to the
question “what caused what?” All that matters is what actually happened, the
transition vt−1 ≺ vt, and the underlying mechanisms. How likely vt−1 was to
occur should not influence the causes and effects within the transition, nor how
strong the causal links are between actual occurrences at t − 1 and t. In other
words, the same transition, involving the same mechanisms and background
conditions should always result in the same causal account. Take, for instance,
a set of nodes AB that output to C, which is a deterministic OR-gate. If C
receives no further inputs from other nodes, then whenever {AB = 11} and
{C = 1}, the causal links, their strength, and the causal account of the transition
{AB = 11} ≺ {C = 1} should be the same as in Fig. 7A (“Disjunction”).
Which larger system the set of nodes was embedded in, or what the probability
was for the transition to happen in the first place, according to the equilibrium,
observed, or any other distribution is not relevant in this context. Let us assume,
for example, that {A = 1} was much more likely to occur than {B = 1}. This
bias in prior probability does not change the fact that, mechanistically, {A = 1}
and {B = 1} have the same effect on {C = 1} and are equivalent causes.
4.2. Distinguishing actual effects and actual causes
An implicit assumption commonly made about (actual) causation is that the
relation between cause and effect is bidirectional: if occurrence C = c had
an effect on occurrence E = e, then c is assumed to be a cause of e (Hitch-
cock, 2001; Yablo, 2002; Woodward, 2003; Halpern and Pearl, 2005; Hall, 2007;
Halpern, 2015; Weslake, 2015; Twardy and Korb, 2011; Fenton-Glynn, 2017). As
demonstrated throughout the Results section, however, this conflation of causes
and effects is untenable once multi-variate transitions vt−1 ≺ vt are considered
(see also next, 4.3). There, an asymmetry between causes and effects simply
arises due to the fact that the set of variables that is affected by an occurrence
xt−1 ⊆ vt−1 typically differs from the set of variables that affects an occurrence
yt ⊆ vt. Take the toy classifier example in Fig. 12: while {B = 0} is the actual
cause of {S = 0}, {B = 0}’s actual effect is {DLS = 100}.
Accordingly, we propose that a comprehensive causal understanding of a
given transition is provided by its complete causal account C (Definition 2.4),
including both actual effects and actual causes. Actual effects are identified from
the perspective of occurrences at t−1, whereas actual causes are identified from
the perspective of occurrences at t. This means that also the causal principles of
composition, integration, and exclusion are applied from these two perspectives.
When we evaluate causal links of the form xt−1 → yt, any occurrence xt−1 may
have one actual effect yt ⊆ vt if xt−1 is irreducible (αmaxe (xt−1) > 0) (Definition
2.2). When we evaluate causal links of the form xt−1 ← yt, any occurrence
yt may have one actual cause xt ⊆ vt−1 if yt is irreducible (αmaxc (yt) > 0)
(Definition 2.1). As seen in the first example (Fig. 6), there may be a high-order
causal link in one direction, but the reverse link may be reducible.
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As mentioned in the Introduction and exemplified in the Supplementary Dis-
cussion, our approach has a more general scope but is still compatible with
the traditional view of actual causation, concerned only with actual causes of
singleton occurrences. Nevertheless, even in the limited setting of singleton vt,
considering both causes and effects may be illuminating. Consider, for example,
the transition shown in Fig. 9A: by itself, the occurrence {A = 1} raises the
probability of {D = 1} (ρe(xt−1, yt) = αe(xt−1, yt) > 0), which is a common de-
terminant of being a cause in probabilistic accounts of (actual) causation (Good,
1961; Suppes, 1970; Eells and Sober, 1983; Pearl, 2009). However, even in deter-
ministic systems with multi-variate dependencies, the fact that an occurrence
c, by itself, raises the probability of an occurrence e, does not necessarily deter-
mine that E = e will actually occur (Paul and Hall, 2013). In the example of
Fig. 9, {A = 1} is neither necessary nor sufficient for {D = 1}. Here, this issue
is resolved by acknowledging that both {A = 1} and {C = 1} have an actual
effect on {D = 1}, whereas {C = 1} is identified as the (one) actual cause of
{D = 1},15 in line with intuition (Halpern, 2015).
In sum, an actual effect xt−1 → yt does not imply the corresponding actual
cause xt−1 ← yt and vice versa. Including both directions in the causal account
may thus provide a more comprehensive explanation of “what happened” in
terms of “what caused what”.
4.3. Composition
The proposed framework of actual causation explicitly acknowledges that there
may be high-order occurrences, which have genuine actual causes or actual ef-
fects. While multi-variate dependencies play an important role in complex dis-
tributed systems (Mitchell, 1998; Sporns, Tononi and Edelman, 2000; Wolff and
O¨lveczky, 2018), they are largely ignored in the actual causation literature.
From a strictly informational perspective focused on predicting yt from xt−1,
one might be tempted to disregard such compositional occurrences and their
actual effects, since they do not add predictive power. For instance, the actual
effect of {AB = 11} in the conjunction example of Fig. 7B is informationally
redundant, since {D = 1} can be inferred (predicted) from {A = 1} and {B =
1} alone. From a causal perspective, however, such compositional causal links
specify mechanistic constraints that would not be captured otherwise. It is these
mechanistic constraints, and not predictive powers, that provide an explanation
for “what happened” in the various transitions shown in Fig. 7 by revealing
“what caused what”. In Fig. 7C for example, the individual nodes A and B do
not fulfill the most basic criterion for having an effect on the XNOR node {E =
15Note that Pearl initially proposed maximizing the posterior probability p(c | e) as a
means of identifying the best (“most probable”) explanation for an occurrence e (Pearl (1988);
Chapter 5). This approach has later been criticized, among others, by Pearl himself (Pearl
(2000); Chapter 7), as it had been formalized in purely probabilistic terms, lacking the notion
of system interventions. Moreover, without a notion of irreducibility, as applied in the present
framework, explanations based on p(c | e) tend to include irrelevant variables (Shimony, 1991;
Chajewska and Halpern, 1997).
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Fig 14. Composition: high-order occurrences. (A) Double Biconditional: Transition and
causal account. (B) Cause repertoires corresponding to the two first-order and one second-
order occurrences with actual causes (see main text).
1} as ρe(xt−1, yt) = 0, whereas the second-order occurrence {AB = 11} has
the actual effect {E = 1}. In the conjunction example (Fig. 7B), {A = 1} and
{B = 1} both constrain the AND-gate D in the same way, but the occurrence
{AB = 11} further raises the probability of {D = 1} compared to the effect
of each individual input. The presence of causal links specified by first-order
occurrences does not exclude the second-order occurrence {AB = 11} from
having an additional effect on {D = 1}.
To illustrate this with respect to both actual causes and actual effects, we
can extend the XNOR example to a “double-biconditional” and consider the
transition vt−1 = {ABC = 111} ≺ vt = {DE = 11} (Fig. 14). In the figure,
both D and E are XNOR nodes that share one of their inputs (node B), and
{AB = 11} ← {D = 1} and {BC = 11} ← {E = 1}. As illustrated by the
cause-repertoires shown in Fig. 14B, and in accordance with D’s and E’s logic
function (mechanism), the actual cause of {D = 1} can be described as the
fact that A and B were in the same state, and the actual cause of {E = 1} as
the fact that B and C were in the same state. In addition to these first-order
occurrences, also the second-order occurrence {DE = 11} has an actual cause
{ABC = 111}, which can be described as the fact that all three nodes A, B,
and C were in the same state. Crucially, this fact is not captured by either
the actual cause of {D = 1}, or by the actual cause of {E = 1}, but only by
the constraints of the second-order occurrence {DE = 11}. On the other hand,
the causal link {ABC = 111} ← {DE = 11} cannot capture the fact that
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{AB = 11} was the actual cause of {D = 1} and {BC = 11} was the actual
cause of {E = 1}. Of note, in this example the same reasoning applies to the
composition of high-order occurrences at t− 1 and their actual effects.
In sum, high-order occurrences capture multi-variate mechanistic dependen-
cies between the occurrence’s variables that are not revealed by the actual causes
and effects of their parts. Moreover, a high-order occurrence does not exclude
lower-order occurrences over their parts, which specify their own actual causes
and effects. In this way, the composition principle makes explicit that high-order
and first-order occurrences all contribute to the explanatory power of the causal
account.
4.4. Integration
As discussed above, high-order occurrences can have actual causes and effects,
but only if they are irreducible to their parts. This is illustrated in Fig. 15,
in which a transition equivalent to our initial example in Fig. 6 (Fig. 15A) is
compared against a similar, but reducible transition (Fig. 15C) in a different
causal network. The two situations differ mechanistically: the OR and AND
gate in Fig. 15A receive common inputs from the same two nodes, while the
OR and AND in Fig. 15C have independent sets of inputs. Nevertheless, the
actual causes and effects of all single-variable occurrences are identical in the
two cases. In both transitions, {OR = 1} is caused by its one input in state
‘1’, and {AND = 0} is caused by its one input in state ‘0’. What distinguishes
the two causal accounts is the additional causal link in Fig. 15A, between the
second-order occurrence {(OR,AND) = 10} and its actual cause {AB = 10}.
{(OR,AND) = 10} raises the probability of both {AB = 10} (in Fig. 15A) and
{AD = 10} (in Fig. 15C) compared to their unconstrained probability pi = 0.25,
and thus ρc(xt−1, yt) > 0 in both cases. Yet, only {AB = 10} ← {(OR,AND) =
10} in Fig. 15A is irreducible to its parts. This is shown by partitioning across
the MIP with αc(xt−1, yt) = 0.17. This second-order occurrence thus specifies
that the OR and AND gate in Fig. 15A receive common inputs—a fact that
would otherwise remain undetected.
As described in the Supplementary Methods, using the measure A(vt−1 ≺
vt) we can also quantify the extent to which the entire causal account C of a
transition vt−1 ≺ vt is irreducible. A(vt−1 ≺ vt) = 0 indicates that vt−1 ≺ vt
can either be decomposed into multiple transitions without causal links between
them (Fig. 15C), or includes variables without any causal role in the transition
(e.g., Fig. 7D).
4.5. Exclusion
That an occurrence can affect several variables (high-order effect), and that
the cause of an occurrence can involve several variables (high-order cause) is
uncontroversial (Woodward, 2010). Nevertheless, the possibility of multi-variate
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Fig 15. Integration: irreducible vs. reducible occurrences. (A) Transition and causal ac-
count of Fig. 6. (B) The second–order occurrence {(OR,AND) = 10} with actual cause
{AB = 10} is irreducible under the MIP. (C) Reducible transition with equivalent first-order
causal links, but missing the second–order causal link present in (A). (D) The constraints
specified by the second–order occurrence {(OR,AND) = 10} here are the same, and thus
reducible, to those under the MIP.
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{(AND, XOR) = 11} is excluded by the minimality condition (Definition 2.2).
causes and effects is rarely addressed in a rigorous manner. Instead of one high-
order occurrence, contingency-based approaches to actual causation typically
identify multiple first-order occurrences as separate causes in these cases (see
also Supplementary Discussion). This is because some approaches only allow
for first-order causes by definition (e.g., Weslake (2015)), while other accounts
include a minimality clause that does not consider causal strength and thus
excludes virtually all high-order occurrences in practice (e.g., Halpern and Pearl
(2005), but see Halpern (2015)). Take the example of a simple conjunction
AND = A ∧ B in transition {AB = 11} ≺ {AND = 1} (Fig. 7B, and Fig.
16). To our knowledge, all contingency-based approaches regard the first-order
occurrences {A = 1} and {B = 1} as two separate causes of {AND = 1} in this
case (but see Datta et al. (2016)), while we identify the second-order occurrence
{AB = 11} (the conjunction) as the one actual cause with αmaxc .
Given a particular occurrence xt−1 in the transition vt−1 ≺ vt, we explic-
itly consider the whole power set of vt as candidate effects of xt−1, and the
whole power set of vt−1 as candidate causes of a particular occurrence yt (Fig.
16). However, the possibility of genuine multi-variate actual causes and effects
requires a principled treatment of causal overdetermination. While most ap-
proaches to actual causation generally allow for both {A = 1} and {B = 1} to
be actual causes of {AND = 1}, this seemingly innocent violation of the causal
exclusion principle becomes prohibitive once {A = 1}, {B = 1}, and {AB = 11}
are recognized as candidate causes. In this case, either {AB = 11} was the actual
cause, or {A = 1}, or {B = 1}. Allowing for any combination of these occur-
rences, however, would be illogical. Within our framework, any occurrence can
thus have at most one actual cause (or effect) within a transition—the minimal
occurrence with αmax (Fig. 16). Finally, cases of true, mechanistic overdeter-
mination due to symmetries in the causal network are resolved by leaving the
actual cause (effect) indetermined between all x∗(yt) with αmaxc (see Definitions
2.1 and 2.2). In this way, the causal account provides a complete picture of the
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actual mechanistic constraints within a given transition.
4.6. Intended scope and limitations
The objective of many existing approaches to actual causation is to provide an
account of people’s intuitive causal judgments (Halpern, 2016). For this reason,
the literature on actual causation is largely rooted in examples involving sit-
uational narratives, such as “Billy and Suzy throw rocks at a bottle” (Pearl,
2000; Halpern, 2016), which are then compressed into a causal model to be
investigated. Such narratives can serve as intuition pumps, but can also lead
to confusion if important aspects of the story are omitted in the causal model
applied to the example (Hitchcock, 2007; Paul and Hall, 2013; Weslake, 2015)
(see Supplementary Discussion).
Our objective is to provide a principled, quantitative causal account of “what
caused what” within a fully specified (complete) model of a physical systems
of interacting elements. We purposely set aside issues regarding model selection
or incomplete causal knowledge in order to formulate a rigorous theoretical
framework applicable to any predetermined, dynamical causal network (Pearl,
2010; Halpern, 2016). This puts the explanatory burden on the formal framework
of actual causation, rather than on the adequacy of the model. In this setting,
causal models should always be interpreted mechanistically and time is explicitly
taken into account. Rather than on capturing people’s intuitions, an emphasis
is put on explanatory power and consistency (see also Paul and Hall (2013)).
With a proper formalism in place, future work should address to what extent
and under which conditions the identified actual causes and effects generalize
across possible levels of description (macro vs. micro causes and effects), or under
incomplete knowledge (see also Rubenstein et al. (2017); Marshall, Albantakis
and Tononi (2018)).
In addition, the examples examined in this study have been limited to direct
causes and effects within transitions vt−1 ≺ vt across a single system update.
The explanatory power of the proposed framework was illustrated in several ex-
amples, which included paradigmatic problem cases involving overdetermination
and prevention. Yet, some prominent examples that raise issues of “preemption”
or “causation by omission” have no direct equivalent in these basic types of phys-
ical causal models (see Supplementary Discussion). While the approach can, in
principle, identify and quantify counterfactual dependencies across k > 1 time
steps by replacing pu(vt | vt−1) with pu(vt | vt−k) in Eqn. 1, for the purpose of
tracing a causal chain back in time (Datta et al., 2016), the role of intermedi-
ary occurrences remains to be investigated. Nevertheless, the present framework
is unique in providing a general, quantitative, and principled approach to ac-
tual causation that naturally extends beyond simple, binary, and deterministic
example cases to all mechanistic systems that can be represented by a set of
transition probabilities as specified in Eqn. 1.
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4.7. Accountability and causal responsibility
This work presents a step towards a quantitative causal understanding of “what
is happening” in systems such as natural or artificial neural networks, comput-
ers, and other discrete, distributed dynamical systems. Such causal knowledge
can be invaluable, for example, to identify the reasons for an erroneous classi-
fication by a convolutional neural network (Szegedy et al., 2013), or the source
of a protocol violation in a computer network (Datta et al., 2015). A notion
of multi-variate actual causes and effects, in particular, is crucial for addressing
questions of accountability, or sources of network failures (Halpern, 2016) in dis-
tributed systems. A better understanding of the actual causal links that govern
a system’s transitions should also improve our ability to effectively control the
dynamical evolution of such systems and to identify adverse system states that
would lead to unwanted system behaviors.
Finally, a principled approach to actual causation in neural networks may
illuminate the causes of an agent’s actions or decisions (biological or artificial)
(Economist, 2018; Knight, 2017; Damasio and Damasio, 2012), including the
causal origin of voluntary actions (Haggard, 2008). However, addressing the
question “who caused what?”, as opposed to “what caused what”, implies mod-
eling an agent with intrinsic causal power and intention (Tononi, 2013; Datta
et al., 2015). Future work will combine the present mechanistic framework for
actual causation with a mechanistic account of autonomous, causal agents, based
on the same set of principles (Marshall et al.; Oizumi, Albantakis and Tononi,
2014).
Supplementary Material
Supplementary Discussion:
(; .pdf). Comparison to current counterfactual approaches to actual causation.
Supplementary Methods:
(; .pdf). Irreducibility of the causal account.
Supplementary Proofs:
(; .pdf). Proof of Theorem 3.1 and 3.2.
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Comparison to current counterfactual
approaches to actual causation
Current counterfactual approaches to actual causation all regard C = c as
an actual cause of E = e if at least one permissible setting of the remaining
variables exists under which C = ¬c leads to E = ¬e. What distinguishes the
various approaches is their (increasingly elaborate) prescribed sets of conditions
for permissible settings, or “contingencies” (e.g., Hitchcock (2001); Yablo (2002);
Woodward (2003); Halpern and Pearl (2005); Hall (2007); Halpern (2015); Wes-
lake (2015)). The notion of counterfactual dependence as a basis for causal judg-
ments can be traced back to Hume (1758) and was elaborated by Lewis (1973).
Pearl (2000) provided a theoretical formulation of counterfactual dependence
within the framework of causal models paired with structural equations. The
subsequently developed Halpern-Pearl (“HP”) definition of actual causation in-
troduced in (Halpern and Pearl, 2001) and updated in (Halpern and Pearl,
2005) remains one of the most influential proposals to date and is frequently
used as a standard for comparison. Nevertheless, counterexamples exist that
raise concerns about the generality of the HP-definition as an account of actual
causation (e.g., Weslake (2015); Halpern (2015)). Halpern (2015, 2016) describes
the original and updated HP-definition of actual causation, as well as a modi-
fied version introduced in (Halpern, 2015), and compares the different proposals
based on a set of frequently cited problem cases. Weslake (2015) provides an
overview of counterfactual approaches to actual causation highlighting specific
example cases that pose problems for the various accounts1. While Weslake
(2015) demonstrates how refining the contingency conditions may address an
increasing number of test cases, he also points out that the resulting sets of
conditions lack a principled justification beyond their successes in singled-out
examples. The same point has recently been made by Beckers and Vennekens
(2018)2.
In the following, we will exemplify similarities and differences between our
proposed account of actual causation (“IIT-account”) and the various HP-
definitions, with reference to several other proposed contingency conditions
(Hitchcock, 2001; Woodward, 2003; Weslake, 2015), as well as probabilistic ac-
counts of actual causation (Twardy and Korb, 2011; Fenton-Glynn, 2017). Since
1Note, however, that Weslake only allows for singleton causes (individual variables), which
is unnecessarily restrictive and goes against the causal composition principle (main text).
Halpern’s modified HP-definition (Halpern, 2015), for example, is equivalent to “PRE” (Wes-
lake, 2015), but allowing for multi-variate causes, which resolves several problem cases.
2Beckers and Vennekens (2018) arrive at a definition of actual causation based on con-
trastive production within a valid timing, following a set of four “principles” derived from
typical problem cases. Their proposed account bears some resemblance to that of Weslake
(2015).
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these comparison accounts do not consider actual effects or causal composition,
here, we will only discuss actual causes of singleton occurrences. Our objective
is to demonstrate that the IIT-account has the potential to provide a princi-
pled approach, rather than sets of contingency conditions. First, however, we
begin with a few remarks on differences in motivation and scope between the
IIT-account and most current approaches to actual causation. For complete-
ness and clarity, this supplementary discussion repeats several points already
addressed in the main text.
1. Differences in motivation and scope
A main motivation behind most accounts of actual causation is to accurately
capture people’s intuitive causal judgments. For this reason, much value is placed
on how a given account fares when applied to causal models that represent
situational narratives. As Halpern and Pearl (2005) put it: “The best way to
judge the adequacy of an approach are the intuitive appeal of the definitions and
how well it deals with examples.” While a useful definition of actual causation
should certainly match the natural language usage of “cause and effect” up to
a point (Paul and Hall, 2013; Halpern, 2016), people’s causal judgments are
often influenced by contextual factors such as typicality and normality, as well
as moral factors (Hitchcock and Knobe, 2009; Halpern and Hitchcock, 2015).
This can lead to contradictory intuitions for the same causal model when placed
within two different narratives (Halpern and Hitchcock, 2015; Weslake, 2015).
By contrast, our interest lies primarily in the principled analysis of actual
causation in distributed dynamical systems, such as artificial neural networks,
computers made of logic gates, or cellular automata, but also biological brain
circuits, or gene regulatory networks (see Introduction, main text). The objec-
tive is to provide a complete, quantitative causal account of “what caused what”
within a transition between two consecutive system states (time t− 1 and t). In
this setting, causal models should always be interpreted mechanistically and an
emphasis is put on explanatory power and consistency, rather than capturing
people’s intuitions (see also Paul and Hall (2013)).
This difference in focus also leads to a difference in scope: while the IIT-
account can, in principle, evaluate causal links across any time interval ∆t, i.e.
within a system transition from time t −∆t to time t, it does not, at present,
address issues regarding causal transitivity, or causal links in non-Markovian
systems. In a follow-up study, we plan to extend the proposed formalism based
on system interventions and partitions to transitions across multiple time steps.
For the moment, however, we restrict ourselves to examples without interme-
diary events between causes and effects. Doing so admittedly sidesteps many
example cases from the philosophical literature, such as the late-preemption
example of Billy and Suzy throwing rocks at a bottle with Suzy’s rock hitting
first (Lewis, 2000). However, some prominent problem cases that are based on
abstract narratives might simply not have an equivalent in physical systems of
interacting mechanisms that take time into account explicitly.
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For example, cases of “preemption” that are frequently discussed in the philo-
sophical literature often do not have an explicit temporal order embedded in the
accompanying causal model (see also Discussion section 4.5, main text). Take,
for instance, the Billy-Suzy rock-throwing problem (see, e.g., Halpern and Pearl
(2005)). If time is taken into account explicitly, Billy’s rock either arrives at the
bottle at the same time as Suzy’s or later (see also Pearl (2000), Section 10.3
“Temporal Preemption”). In the first case, the preemption example reduces to
a case of symmetric overdetermination (main text, Fig. 5A). In the second case,
Billy’s rock could not have been a cause of the bottle shattering at time t in the
first place. A time-indexed solution to this example is provided in (Halpern and
Pearl, 2005) in addition to the “simple” solution that introduces the additional
variables “Suzy’s throw hits” and “Billy’s throw hits” into the causal model. As
noted by Halpern and Pearl, the time-indexed model avoids an objection to the
“simple” solution, where one could argue that the additional variables adjust
the causal model in precisely the way to produce the desirable result.
Given the present focus on discrete dynamical systems, “causation by omis-
sion” is also not an issue, since an element’s state labels (e.g., “0” or “1”, “a” or
“b”, etc.) have no implicit meaning and should thus play no role in the causal
analysis.
In the following, we provide some examples showing that the IIT-account pro-
vides a general, consistent, and principled approach to actual causation across
a wide range of cases of direct, mechanistic influences.
2. Examples highlighting similarities and differences
This section summarizes the results of various accounts of actual causation
(Halpern and Pearl (2005); Halpern (2015); Weslake (2015) and references therein)
applied to several examples, including:
• “Majority Voting”
• “Forest-Fire” (also called “Window”): FF := L ∧M (conjunctive) and
FF := L ∨M (disjunctive)
• “Loader”: D := (A ∧B) ∨ C
• “Complicated Voting”: see Fig. 8 (main text)
• “Command”: C := (M = 1) ∨ (S = 1 ∧M 6= 2)
• “Combination Lamp”: L := (A = B) ∨ (B = C) ∨ (A = C)
• “Majority Voting with three choices”
taken from (Schaffer, 2000; Livengood, 2013; Weslake, 2015; Halpern, 2015,
2016).
For formal definitions we refer the reader to the original publications. Here
we briefly summarize the algorithms behind the various HP-definitions within
the present scope of direct influences without intermediary variables, i.e., given
a transition vt−1 ≺ vt3.
3 This reduces the subset ~Z ⊂ ~V to ~X in the formal HP-definitions given, e.g., in (Halpern,
2015).
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All HP-definitions provide three conditions AC1-3. AC1 states that both the
occurrence yt ⊆ vt and its candidate cause xt−1 ⊆ vt−1 must actually happen.
This is equivalent to our first causal principle of realization (main text). AC3 is
a minimality condition stating that there must not be a subset of xt−1 that also
satisfies AC1 and AC2. While the same condition holds in the IIT-account, the
HP-definitions generally allow for multiple causes of an occurrence, the modified
HP-definition even for multiple causes with overlapping subsets of variables.
By contrast, the IIT-account only allows for one occurrence xt−1 ⊆ vt−1 to
be an actual cause of yt according to its causal exclusion principle; xt−1 can,
however, be multi-variate. Finally, AC2 specifies the permissible contingencies
under which the counterfactual dependence of yt on xt−1 is tested by setting
Xt−1 to a different state x′t−1 ∈ ΩX . The original, updated, and modified HP-
definition are thus distinguished by their particular AC2.
The original HP-definition allows setting the contingency Wt−1 ⊆ Vt−1\Xt−1
into any state wt−1 ∈ ΩW , as long as doing so would ensure that Yt still takes its
actual state yt whenever Xt−1 = xt−14. The updated HP-definition, in addition,
restricts the permissible contingency conditions wt to be such that Yt takes its
actual state yt when Xt−1 = xt−1, even if any subset of Wt−1 is switched back to
its actual state5. This additional requirement allows the updated HP-definition
to resolve the “Loader” example (see below).
Halpern (2015) introduced a third variant, the “modified” HP-definition. AC2
according to the modified HP-definition requires all variables in Wt−1 ⊆ Vt−1 \
Xt−1 to take their actual values. Causes identified by the modified HP-definition
thus correspond to all minimal sets of variables that, if they were altered, would
change the state of Yt from its actual state yt to another state y
′
t ∈ ΩY .
In section 3, we will discuss how these proposed contingency conditions relate
to the IIT-account. First, however, let us compare their respective results in the
various problem cases listed above:
2.1. Majority voting
We start with the following simple voting scenario taken from Halpern (2016)
(Example 2.3.2) as it highlights the differences between the various HP-definitions
and our approach: consider 11 voters deciding between two candidates (A and
B) based on a simple majority count. The causal model to this scenario corre-
sponds to a linear threshold unit with k = 6 (Eqn. 17) in the main text, Fig.
6), that is, a Majority-gate with 11 inputs. As discussed in (Halpern, 2016),
in the case of a 6-5 win for A all HP-definitions agree that each of the voters
in favor of A counts as an actual cause of A’s win, meaning that there are 6
first-order actual causes. Note that each of these causes is necessary for A’s win,
but only their conjunction is sufficient. As stated in Theorem 3.1 (main text),
4Under the restricted scope of direct causal influences, the original HP-definition is equiva-
lent to that of Hitchcock (2001) and AC* of Woodward (2003), which, however do not explicitly
include a minimality condition akin to AC3.
5Note that the formal definitions for the original and updated HP-definitions include more
details, which, however, do not matter in the present context.
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our proposed causal analysis identifies the entire set of 6 voters in favor of A
as the one higher-order actual cause, which arguably is more intuitive because
it is the only occurrence at t − 1 that is both necessary and sufficient for the
outcome.
In the second situation all 11 voters decide in favor of candiate A—a case
of overdetermination. Here the updated and original HP-definitions still de-
clare each voter a first-order actual cause, while none is necessary or sufficient.
Halpern’s modified definition (Halpern, 2016), however, finds every subset of
six voters a higher-order cause of A’s win (each minimally sufficient set). This
seems like our proposed solution: one of the subsets of six voters is the actual
cause of A’s win; which one, however, remains undetermined. This distinction
drawn by the IIT-account is due to the causal exclusion principle (every occur-
rence can have at most one actual cause). To illustrate, declaring every subset
of six voters a cause would mean that each voter contributed to 252 causes,
which would multiply their causal power beyond necessity and should thus be
avoided.
Note, moreover, that the modified HP account does not generally identify
minimally sufficient sets as the actual cause (see Halpern (2016), section 2.6),
even in similar majority voting examples. This becomes apparent if we consider
other possible scenarios that could lead to A’s win, such as (i) a 10-1 win, or
(ii) a 8-3 win, etc. The IIT-account consistently identifies a minimally sufficient
set (in this case a subset of 6 voters) as the actual cause in any linear threshold
example, as proven in Theorem 3.1 (main text). By contrast, the modified HP-
definition gives different results in all cases. In (i) it would identify all sets of 5
A-voters and in (ii) all sets of 3 A-voters as causes of A’s win (corresponding
to the number of votes that would have to be switched in order to change the
outcome). This is despite the fact that, mechanistically, 6 votes are required for
A’s win no matter the actual number.
2.2. “Forest-Fire”: conjunctive and disjunctive
In the “Forest-Fire” example, a forest catches fire if lightning strikes (L) and/or
an arsonist drops a match (M). The causal models pertaining to the “Forest-
Fire” examples, both the conjunctive (FF := L ∧M) and disjunctive (FF :=
L∨M) cases, are in fact also linear threshold units with two inputs. Intuitively,
the conjunctive case corresponds to an “AND” logic-gate, while the disjunctive
case corresponds to an “OR” logic-gate (see Fig. 5A,B, main text). Let us assume
the standard setting where lightning strikes (L = 1), the match is dropped
(M = 1) and, subsequently, the forest catches fire (FF = 1). As shown in
Fig. 5A and B, in the conjunctive case, our approach identifies the high-order
occurrence {LM = 11} as the actual cause, while in the disjunctive case it
declares either of the first-order occurrences L = 1 or M = 1 as the actual cause
with indeterminacy between the two. Note that these solutions correspond to
the mechanistic logic structure of the two cases.
By contrast, the various HP-definitions take both L = 1 and M = 1 as
separate first-order causes in the conjunctive case, but explicitly deny that the
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higher-order conjunctive occurrence {LM = 11} is a cause (Halpern, 2016).
The original and updated definition give the same result in the disjunctive case,
while the modified definition declares {LM = 11} to be a high-order cause in the
disjunctive version, arguably reversing the logical structures of the examples. In
accordance with Halpern (2015), we see it as a feature of our account that it
can distinguish the two scenarios. By contrast to the modified HP-definition,
however, the IIT solution fits the logical setup (see also Datta et al. (2016)).
2.3. “Loader”
This example corresponds to the disjunction of conjunctions shown in Fig. 7:
D := (A ∧ B) ∨ C. One story accompanying this example is that “a prisoner
dies either if A loads B’s gun and B shoots, or if C loads and shoots his gun.
(. . . ) A loads B’s gun, B does not shoot, but C does load and shoot his gun,
so that the prisoner dies” (Hopkins and Pearl, 2003; Halpern, 2015). Intuition
suggests that A = 1 should not be regarded as a cause of death D = 1 in the
case that B = 0. Nevertheless, A = 1 does raise the probability for D = 1 by
itself (when B and C are left undetermined, i.e., are causally marginalized) (Fig.
7, main text). However, the one actual cause of D = 1 according to the IIT-
account is C = 1, in line with the updated and modified HP-definition, as well
as (Weslake, 2015). The original HP-definition, however, would count A = 1 as
a cause, which motivated the updated HP-definition in the first place (Weslake,
2015; Halpern, 2015, 2016). Note that, in the overdetermined case with A = 1,
B = 1, and C = 1, the IIT-account identifies either the higher-order occurrence
{AB = 11} or the first-order occurrence {C = 1} as the actual cause with
indeterminism between the two minimally sufficient possibilities. The original
and updated HP-definition, as well as (Weslake, 2015), would call the first-order
occurrences {A = 1}, {B = 1}, and {C = 1} causes. The modified HP-definition
would, in fact, declare the higher-order occurrences {AC = 11} and {BC = 11}
as causes, although neither is necessary nor minimally sufficient for {D = 1}.
2.4. “Complicated Voting”
See Fig. 8, main text. This example is discussed in Halpern (2015, 2016). If A and
B agree, F takes their value, if B, C, D, and E agree, F takes A’s value, other-
wise majority decides. The actual transition is {ABCDE = 11000} ≺ {F = 1}.
As described in the main text (section 3.4), the IIT-account declares the occur-
rence {AB = 11} the actual cause of {F = 1}, in line with intuition. None of
the HP-definitions arrive at this result without introducing additional variables
to the example. The original and updated HP-definitions would declare each
of the inputs a first-order cause of {F = 1}, while the modified HP-definition
identifies {A = 1} as a first-order cause, but also the higher-order occurrences
{BC = 10}, {BD = 10}, and {BE = 10} (see Halpern (2016), which corrects
the result in Halpern (2015)). The IIT-account captures the mechanistic struc-
ture of the example and demonstrates that it is possible to resolve this problem
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case without the need of additional variables. Arguably, the additional variables
introduced by Halpern (2015, 2016) only serve to build the desired result into
the causal model (see also section 2.8 below).
2.5. “Command”
An example in which the original and updated HP-definition arguably do not
align with intuition is the non-binary “Command” example, a case of “trumping-
preemption” (Schaffer, 2000; Weslake, 2015; Halpern, 2015, 2016). In this exam-
ple, a major (M) and a sergeant (S) give orders to a corporal (C). M and S can
take three values depending on what the major and sergeant do. They can each
either do nothing (0), order the corporal to “shoot” (1) or to “halt” (2). The
major’s orders trump those of the sergeant: C := (M = 1) ∨ (S = 1 ∧M 6= 2).
The situation considered is that in which the major and the sergeant both order
the corporal to shoot (MS = 11 leading to C = 1). The original and updated
HP-definition consider S = 1 a cause of C = 1 even though the major’s orders
(M = 1) trump those of the sergeant, which means that the corporal would
have shot (C = 1) given M = 1 no matter what the sergeant would have done.
By contrast, Halpern’s modified HP-definition (Halpern, 2015) and also Weslake
(2015) do not count S = 1 as a cause of C = 1. Our account agrees with the
latter and declares M = 1 the sole actual cause of C = 1 with αmaxc = 1.17.
This example, moreover, demonstrates that the IIT-account can indeed be ap-
plied to causal networks with discrete, non-binary variables, identifying again
the minimally sufficient set of variables as the actual cause.
2.6. “Combination Lamp”
Another example that shows that the original and updated HP-definition have
trouble with causal models including non-binary variables is the “Combination
Lamp” example proposed by (Weslake, 2015). A lamp (L) has three switches
(A, B, C), which can be in one of three states (−1, 0, or 1). The lamp switches
on iff at least two of the switches are in the same position: L := (A = B)∨ (B =
C)∨ (A = C). The setting considered is A = 1, B = −1, and C = −1 leading to
L = 1. As in the previous example, the original and updated HP-definition
declare all switches causes of L = 1, while the modified HP-definition and
Weslake’s proposed account only regard B = 1 and C = 1 as (separate) causes.
Here, our account specifically determines the joint occurrence {BC = 11} as the
actual cause of L = 1 with αmaxc = 1.95. By comparison, the entire set of inputs
{ABC = (−1)11} has a lower αc = 0.363 and is thus excluded from being a
cause. Notably, the individual elements all have αc = 0, as their individual state
does not matter at all for the state of L. An intervention on only one input
variable would not grant any control over the state of L; whether L switches
on or not would be entirely left to uncontrolled influences. The actual cause
specified by the IIT-account, by contrast, identifies an ideal (minially sufficient)
controller for L = 1.
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2.7. Majority voting given three options
As a final non-binary example we consider a voting scenario suggested by (Liven-
good, 2013). For computational reasons, we will consider 15 voters that vote 13-2
in favor of candidate A instead of the original example of 19 voters that vote
17-2. First, let us consider the binary case in which the voters choose between
candidate A and B. In line with the first example and Theorem 3.1 (main text),
our account would consider one out of all minimally sufficient sets of 8 A-voters
the actual cause of A’s win— which one remains undetermined. By contrast,
the original and updated HP-definition would consider each of the 15 voters for
A a cause of A’s win.
We now add a third candidate C and consider the vote 13-2-0 for A, B,
and C, respectively. Throughout we assume that none of the candidates wins
in case of a tie for the maximum number of votes. In this three-candidate case,
the original and updated HP-definition also count the two voters who voted for
B as causes of A’s win. Note that the number of votes for B may matter for
A’s win in other configurations, for example, if the vote was 7-4-4, or 7-5-3.
However, in the actual case of 13-2-0 the A-voters surpassed a simple majority
and, by themselves, the B-votes each decrease A’s probability to win. Here, as
in the binary version, the IIT-account identifies an undetermined set of 8 of
the 13 A-voters as the actual cause with αmaxc = 1.82, while αc = 0 for the
B-voters. In the specific case of a 7-4-4 vote, the IIT-account identifies a set
of {7 × A, 2 × B, 2 × C} voters as the actual cause (αmaxc = 1.82). If any of
the votes had been different, A might not have won, so only the whole set is
sufficient here. To see why this set is minimally sufficient, consider 7-2-1, in this
case, if the remaining 5 voters cast their ballots for B, then the result would be
7-7-1, a tie, in which case A is not considered the winner. Note again, however,
that the IIT-account of actual causation does not presuppose sufficiency as a
requirement for causation. Instead, the minimally sufficient sets emerge as actual
causes in these voting scenarios as a consequence of applying the five principles
of causation.
Finally, how the modified HP-account would fair in the above example is
not entirely clear. Halpern revised the original verdict from (Halpern, 2015) in
(Halpern, 2016), stating that the B votes are parts of causes. Yet, it seems to us
that the correct answer according to the modified HP-definition should be that
any set of 6 voters for A is a cause of A′s win. This is because changing 6 votes
from A to B would change the outcome to a win for B instead of A (satisfying
requirement AC2m). Since the 6 A-voters are a subset of the cause specified in
(Halpern, 2016), it excludes the larger set from being a cause according to AC3.
2.8. A note on introducing additional variables and the value of a
mechanistic scope
Frequently in the philosophical literature, solutions to causal dilemmas are pro-
posed in which the original causal model is modified. To disambiguate the model,
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additional variables are introduced. This is warranted if the original model did
not capture all relevant features of the accompanying narrative (e.g., modeling
the Billy-Suzy rock-throwing example as a simple case of symmetric overdeter-
mination ignores an important part of the narrative: that Suzy’s rock actually
hits the bottle while Billy’s does not (Halpern and Pearl, 2005; Halpern, 2016)).
In other cases, however, the practice of adding variables just deflects from the
original problem. Halpern (2015), for example, argues in favor of a “richer”
model to the “Combination Lamp” example for which the results of the original
and updated HP-definitions seem more intuitive. The “richer” model is interest-
ing by itself, but it is a different physical system. If the mechanism L is actually
the one described in “Combination Lamp” with direct inputs from A, B, and C,
changing this causal model to include intermediary variables does not resolve
the original problem. See also the proposal to introduce an additional variable to
“Loader” (Halpern (2016), section 2.8.1) to redeem the original HP-definition,
or “Complicated Voting” (Halpern (2016), section 4.1.4). In the realm of dis-
crete dynamical systems, the causal model corresponds to a physical system of
interacting mechanisms and thus is what it is. Either an account can provide a
satisfactory answer or it cannot. Restricting one’s scope to physical systems of
interacting mechanisms can thus shed light on the consistency and explanatory
power of an actual causation account per se.
3. Conceptual differences
In this section, we provide some additional discussion of three important con-
ceptual differences between the IIT-account and existing accounts of actual cau-
sation.
3.1. Marginalizing across contingencies
Accounts of actual causation typically identify actual causes by testing coun-
terfactual dependence under a set of contingency conditions (Hitchcock, 2001;
Yablo, 2002; Woodward, 2003; Halpern and Pearl, 2005; Hall, 2007; Halpern,
2015; Weslake, 2015). Here we argue that testing the counterfactual dependence
between yt and xt−1 directly, by employing causal marginalization, is more gen-
eral and eliminates the need for elaborate sets of contingency conditions.
A single variable Yt often depends on multiple input variables {Xj,t−1}, as
specified by the causal network or, equivalently, Yt’s structural equation. In such
a setting, the counterfactual dependence of yt on a single-variable occurrence
xj,t−1 may only appear for specific contingencies (states of Wt−1 = Vt−1\Xj,t−1
other than its actual state). A simple “but-for” test given the actual state
Wt−1 = wt−1 would thus fail in this case. There are certain examples of this
situation where intuition suggests that Xj,t−1 should be the actual cause (or
at least part of the actual cause) of Yt (e.g., cases of overdetermination as in
2.1 and 2.2). This motivates the assessment of counterfactual dependence under
contingencies. However, there are other examples in which the intuition is that
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Xj,t−1 should not be a cause of Yt (e.g., “Loader” 2.3), and these examples fur-
ther motivate putting restrictions on the set of permissible contingencies under
which one evaluates counterfactual dependence (Weslake, 2015; Halpern, 2016).
For any account of actual causation based on contingency conditions, whether
or not there is a counterfactual dependence between yt and xt−1 is assessed based
on a specific state of Wt−1 = Vt−1 \Xt−1. Consequently, xt−1 is not evaluated
based on its own merits. This leads to counter-intuitive results that go against
the logical structure of the example mechanisms (see section 2). The modified
HP-definition (Halpern, 2015), for instance, reverses the logical structure in
the conjunctive and disjunctive “Forest-Fire” example (identifying two separate
causes in the conjunctive “AND” case, and a joint cause in the disjunctive “OR”
case), while the original and updated HP-definitions cannot distinguish between
the two cases (see also Datta et al. (2015)).
In the framework proposed here, we determine the actual cause of an occur-
rence yt starting from yt’s cause-repertoire pi(Vt−1|yt) (Eqn. 4, main text) over
all variables Vt−1. For a single element occurrence yt in a deterministic causal
model this interventional conditional probability distribution simply identifies
all possible states of Vt−1 out of ΩVt−1 that are consistent with Yt = yt. The
cause-repertoire is akin to the “redundancy range” of yt specified by Hitch-
cock (2001)6. The common idea is to fix Yt in its actual state yt and then look
backward to identify the range of possible causes in Vt−1.
From the cause-repertoire over Vt−1, we can obtain the cause-repertoire pi(Xt−1|yt)
of a particular subset of variables Xt−1 ⊆ Vt−1 by causally marginalizing over
all variables in Vt−1 \Xt−1. The cause-repertoire pi(Xt−1|yt) corresponds to the
contingency under which the (strength of) the counterfactual dependence be-
tween yt and xt−1 is evaluated. However, instead of being fixed in any particular
state, the variables Vt−1 \Xt−1 are causally marginalized.7 In this way, we en-
sure that the counterfactual dependence between yt and xt−1 is independent of
the state of Vt−1 \Xt−1.8
6Technically, the “redundancy range” corresponds to the counterfactual states of all off-
path variables (here Vt−1 \ Xt−1) under which Yt = yt holds, when Xt−1 = xt−1. The
cause-repertoire also includes other possible states of Xt−1.
7The causal network Gu itself is still conditioned on the state of the exogenous variables
U = u. We thus explicitly distinguish between fixed background conditions (U = u) and
other relevant variables (Vt−1 \ Xt−1) whose counterfactuals must be considered (see also
McDermott (2002)).
8Marginalizing across all possible states of Vt−1 \ Xt−1 bears some resemblance to suf-
ficiency accounts of actual causation that require that Yt = yt follows Xt−1 = xt−1, under
every possible state of Vt−1 \Xt−1 (McDermott, 2002; Woodward, 2003; Weslake, 2015). Such
sufficiency accounts, however, do not test for counterfactual dependence between yt and xt−1
or have to be extended by a set of contingency conditions (Weslake, 2015) akin to those of
(Hitchcock, 2001; Halpern and Pearl, 2001, 2005). This again is a consequence of assuming
fixed states for Vt−1 \Xt−1. The IIT-account typically identifies a minimally sufficient set of
variables as the actual cause of a singleton occurrence yt in deterministic causal models. How-
ever, the approach of causally marginalizing across the states of Vt−1 \Xt−1 naturally extends
to the probabilistic case and provides a measure of the causal strength of the counterfactual
dependence between yt and xt−1.
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3.2. Quantifying counterfactual dependence
In the IIT-account of actual causation, we quantify the counterfactual depen-
dence between xt−1 and yt by comparing how an occurrence yt increases the
likelihood of the past state xt−1, compared to all other possible states of Yt. This
is captured by the cause ratio ρc(xt−1, yt) (Eqn. 12, main text)9. For a single-
variable occurrence ρc(xt−1, yt) = αc(xt−1, yt), which determines the strength of
the counterfactual causal link between xt−1 and yt. By contrast, most accounts
of actual causation take counterfactual dependence to be an “all-or-nothing con-
cept” (Halpern, 2016). An occurrence xt−1 is typically considered a cause of yt
if there exists one specific counterfactual x′t−1 ∈ ΩXt\xt for which Yt 6= yt. In the
case of binary variables, this condition implies that ρc(xt−1, yt) > 0. However,
this does not have to be the case for non-binary variables, where the advantages
of comparing xt−1 to an average of all its possible states become apparent (see
e.g., 2.7).
There are also probabilistic, counterfactual accounts of actual causation,
which are typically based on the notion that causes should raise the proba-
bility of their effects, such as the requirement that p(e | c) > p(e) (Good, 1961;
Suppes, 1970; Eells and Sober, 1983; Lewis, 1986). In the present context of
causal networks, or equivalently, structural equation models, the same condi-
tion is required to hold under interventions, that is, p(e | do(C = c)) > p(e)
(Pearl, 2000, 2009). However, just as in the case of deterministic counterfactual
dependence, p(e | do(C = c)) > p(e) might only hold under certain contingen-
cies. In fact, it has been argued that probability raising per se might neither
be necessary nor sufficient for actual causation (Hitchcock, 2004; Fenton-Glynn,
2017).
Twardy and Korb (2011) and Fenton-Glynn (2017) recently proposed exten-
sions of contingency-based accounts of actual causation to probabilistic causal
models. While Twardy and Korb (2011) and Fenton-Glynn (2017) employ prob-
abilities, they still treat actual causation as an “all-or-nothing” concept. Causes
are generally considered to be single variables and identified based on contin-
gency conditions. Therefore, these probabilistic accounts inherit the merits and
problems of the deterministic accounts of actual causation they are based on
(Hitchcock, 2001; Halpern and Pearl, 2001). All reservations about accounts of
actual causation based on contingency conditions raised in the previous section
still apply. In addition, the claim that a cause does not necessarily raise the prob-
ability of its effect only holds true if the remaining variables Wt−1 = Vt−1\Xt−1
are fixed in a particular state. The IIT-account instead leaves the state of Wt−1
undetermined to avoid any dependencies on wt−1 while evaluating ρc(xt−1, yt)
(and thus p(yt|do(Xt−1 = xt−1))). In this case, ρc(xt−1, yt) > 0 is a necessary,
but not sufficient, requirement for xt−1 to be a cause of yt, meaning that xt−1,
by itself, must raise the probability of yt.
9Note that ρc(xt−1, yt) is identical to ρe(xt−1, yt), if yt is a single-variable occurrence.
While we technically take the perspective of yt to identify its actual cause and compare
pi(xt−1|yt) to pi(xt−1), this is equivalent to comparing pi(yt|xt−1) to pi(yt).
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Another advantage of the IIT-account is that ρc(xt−1, yt) already provides an
initial measure of causal strength that quantifies the causal link between xt−1
and yt and can be compared across all possible candidate causes
10. Probabilistic
accounts that identify actual causes based on specific contingencies w′t−1, such
as (Twardy and Korb, 2011) and (Fenton-Glynn, 2017), do not provide a unique
quantifier for the causal link between xt−1 and yt, since the difference between
p(yt|do(Xt−1 = xt−1)) and p(yt|do(Xt−1 = x′t−1)) depends on w′t−1 and there
may be multiple permissible w′t−1.
3.3. Identifying the actual cause
In general, it is possible that yt is counterfactually dependent on more than
one variable (or even more than one set of variables). Some accounts of actual
causation only allow for singleton causes and effects (Weslake, 2015), exclud-
ing multi-variate causes by definition. Under the HP-definition, supersets of
actual causes are excluded from being causes themselves by a minimality clause
(“AC3”) (Halpern and Pearl, 2005; Halpern, 2015). Nevertheless, these accounts
still allow for yt to have potentially many different actual causes, as long as they
fulfill the imposed contingency conditions. Note that this limits the explanatory
power of individual causes considerably, as it remains unclear whether an iden-
tified (singleton) cause was sufficient or necessary, both or neither. Even the
complete set of causes often does not illuminate the mechanistic connection
between causes and effect (see, e.g., 2.2).
The IIT-account follows a causal exclusion principle, allowing only one cause
for a given occurrence yt out of all possible occurrences xt−1 ⊆ vt−1. To identify
the actual cause of yt, we measure and compare the strength αc(xt−1, yt) of all
possible causal links with yt. The actual cause x
∗
t−1 of yt is the occurrence with
maximal causal strength (αc(x
∗
t−1, yt) = α
max
c (yt)). Ties in causal strength can
occur for two reasons: first, adding inessential elements to x∗t−1 has no effect
on αmaxc (yt). For this reason, we include a minimality condition similar to AC3:
any superset of x∗t−1 with the same α
max
c (yt) is excluded from being a possible
cause. Second, ties can also occur under symmetries in the causal model, in
cases of true causal overdetermination. Upholding the causal exclusion principle,
such degenerate cases are resolved by noting that the one actual cause x∗t−1
remains undetermined between all minimal xt−1 with αc(xt−1, yt) = αmaxc (yt).
As demonstrated in the above example cases (see Section 2), the actual cause
identified by the IIT-account consistently captures the mechanistic connection
between cause and effect.
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Irreducibility of the causal account
Similar to the notion of system-level integration in integrated information
theory (IIT) (Oizumi, Albantakis and Tononi, 2014; Albantakis and Tononi,
2015), the principle of integration can also be applied to the causal account as
a whole, not only to individual causal links. The causal account of a particular
transition vt−1 ≺ vt of the dynamical causal network Gu is defined as the set of
all causal links within the transition (Definition 2.4, main text).
In the following we define the quantity A(vt−1 ≺ vt), which measures to what
extent the transition vt−1 ≺ vt is irreducible to its parts. Moreover, we introduce
Ae(vt−1 ≺ vt), which measures the irreducibility of vt−1 and its set of “effect”
causal links {xt−1 → yt} ∈ C(vt−1 ≺ vt), and Ac(vt−1 ≺ vt), which measures the
irreducibility of vt and its set of “cause” causal links {xt−1 ← yt} ∈ C(vt−1 ≺ vt).
In this way, we can
• identify irrelevant variables within a causal account that do not contribute
to any causal link (Fig. 1A),
• evaluate how entangled the sets of causes and effects are within a transition
vt−1 ≺ vt (Fig. 1B), and
• compare A values between (sub)transitions, in order to identify clusters of
variables whose causes and effects are highly entangled, or only minimally
connected (Fig. 1C).
We can assess the irreducibility of vt−1 and its set of “effect” causal links
{xt−1 → yt} ∈ C(vt−1 ≺ vt) in parallel to αe(xt−1, yt), by testing all possi-
ble partitions Ψ(vt−1, Vt) (Eqn. 7, main text). This means that, the transition
vt−1 ≺ vt is partitioned into independent parts in the same manner that an
occurrence xt−1 is partitioned when assessing αe(xt−1, yt). We then define the
irreducibility of vt−1 as the difference in the total strength of actual effects
(causal links of the form xt−1 → yt) in the complete causal account C com-
pared to the causal account under the MIP, which again denotes the partition
in Ψ(vt−1, Vt) that makes the least difference to C:
Ae(vt−1 ≺ vt) =
∑
x→y∈C
(αmaxe (x))−
∑
x→y∈CMIP
(αmaxe (x)MIP) (1)
In the same way, the irreducibility of vt and its set of causal links {xt−1 ← yt} ∈
C(vt−1 ≺ vt) is defined as the difference in the total strength of actual causes
(causal links of the form xt−1 ← yt) in the causal account C compared to the
causal account under the MIP:
Ac(vt−1 ≺ vt) =
∑
x←y∈C
(αmaxc (y))−
∑
x←y∈CMIP
(αmaxc (y)MIP) (2)
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Fig 1. Reducible and irreducible causal accounts. (A) “Prevention” example (see Fig. 7D,
main text). A = 0 bits as {A = 1} does not contribute to any causal links. (B) Irreducible
transition (see Fig. 6, main text). A partition of the transition along the MIP destroys the
2nd-order causal link, leading to A = 0.17 bits. (C) In larger systems, A can be used to identify
(sub)transitions with highly entangled causes and effect. While the causes and effects in the full
transition are only weakly entangled with A = 0.03 bits, the top and bottom (sub)transitions
are irreducible with A = 0.83 bits.
where the MIP is again the partition that makes the least difference out of all
possible partitions Ψ(Vt−1, vt) (Eqn. 9, main text). This means that the transi-
tion vt−1 ≺ vt is partitioned into independent parts in the same manner that an
occurrence yt is partitioned when assessing αc(xt−1, yt). The irreducibility of a
single-variable vt−1 or vt reduces to αmaxe of its one actual effect yt, or α
max
c of
its one actual cause xt−1, respectively.
By considering the union of possible partitions, Ψ(vt−1 ≺ vt) = Ψ(vt−1, Vt)∪
Ψ(Vt−1, vt), we can moreover assess the overall irreducibility of the transition
vt−1 ≺ vt. A transition vt−1 ≺ vt is reducible if there is a partition ψ ∈ Ψ(vt−1 ≺
vt) such that the total strength of causal links in C(vt−1 ≺ vt) is unaffected by
the partition. Based on this notion we define the irreducibility of a transition
vt−1 ≺ vt as:
A(vt−1 ≺ vt) =
∑
αmax(C)−
∑
αmax(CMIP), (3)
where ∑
αmax(C) =
∑
x→y∈C
(αmaxe (x)) +
∑
x←y∈C
(αmaxc (y))
is a summation over the strength of all causal links in the causal account
C(vt−1 ≺ vt), and the same for the partitioned causal account CMIP.
Fig. 1A shows the “Prevention” example of Fig. 7D, main text. {A = 1}
has no effect and is no cause in this transition. Replacing {A = 1} with an
average over all its possible states does not make a difference to the causal
account and thus A(vt−1 ≺ vt) = 0 in this case. Fig. 1B shows the causal
account CMIP of the transition vt−1 ≺ vt with vt−1 = vt = {OR,AND = 10}
under its MIP into m = 2 parts with A(vt−1 ≺ vt) = 0.17. This is the causal
strength that would be lost if we treated vt−1 ≺ vt as two separate transitions
{ORt−1 = 1} ≺ {ORt = 1} and {ANDt−1 = 0} ≺ {ANDt = 0} instead of a
single one within Gu.
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The irreducibility A(vt−1 ≺ vt) provides a measure of how causally “entan-
gled” the variables V are during the transition vt−1 ≺ vt. In a larger system,
we can measure and compare the A values of multiple (sub)transitions. In Fig.
1C, for example, the causes and effects of the full transition are only weakly
entangled (A = 0.03 bits), while the transitions involving the four upper or
lower variables, respectively, are much more irreducible (A = 0.83 bits). In this
way, A(vt−1 ≺ vt) may be a useful quantity when evaluating more parsimonious
causal explanations against the complete causal account of the full transition.
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Supplementary Proof 1
The first theorem describes the actual causes and effects for an observation
of a linear threshold unit (LTU) Vt = {Yt} with n inputs and threshold k,
and its inputs Vt−1. First, a series of lemmas are demonstrated based on the
transition probabilities qc,j : if Xt−1 = xt−1 ⊆ Vt−1 = vt−1 is an occurrence
with size |Xt−1| = c and j of the c elements in Xt−1 are in the ‘ON’ state
(
∑
x∈xt−1 x = j), then
qc,j = p(Yt = 1|Xt−1 = xt−1) =

n−c∑
i=k−j
1
2n−c
(
n−c
i
)
if j ≤ k and j > k − (n− c)
1 if j ≥ k
0 if j < k − (n− c)
First we demonstrate that the probabilities qc,j are non-decreasing as the num-
ber of ‘ON’ inputs j increases for a fixed size of occurrence c, and that there
is a specific range of values of j and c such that the probabilities are strictly
increasing.
Lemma 1.1. qc,j ≥ qc,j−1 with qc,j = qc,j−1 iff j > k or j < k − (n− c).
Proof. If j > k then
qc,j = qc,j−1 = 1.
If j < k − (n− c) then
qc,j = qc,j−1 = 0.
If k − (n− c) ≤ j ≤ k then
qc,j =
1
2n−c
n−c∑
i=k−j
(
n− c
i
)
=
1
2n−c
n−c∑
i=k−(j−1)
(
n− c
i
)
− 1
2n−c
= qc,j−1+
1
2n−c
> qc,j−1
Next we demonstrate two results relating the transition probabilities between
occurrences of different sizes,
Lemma 1.2. qc,j =
1
2 (qc+1,j + qc+1,j+1) for 1 ≤ c < n and 0 ≤ j ≤ c.
Proof. If j ≥ k then
qc,j = qc+1,j = qc+1,j+1 = 1,
so
qc,j =
1
2
(qc+1,j + qc+1,j+1) = 1.
If j = k − 1 then
qc+1,j+1 = 1,
1
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and
qc,j = qc,k−1 =
1
2n−c
n−c∑
i=1
(
n− c
i
)
=
1
2n−c
1 + n−(c+1)∑
i=1
(
n− (c+ 1)
i− 1
)
+
(
n− (c+ 1)
i
)
=
1
2
 1
2n−(c+1)
n−(c+1)∑
i=1
(
n− (c+ 1)
i
)
+
1
2n−(c+1)
n−(c+1)∑
i=0
(
n− (c+ 1)
i
)
=
1
2
(qc+1,j + 1)
=
1
2
(qc+1,j + qc+1,j+1)
If j < k − (n− c) then
qc,j = qc+1,j = qc+1,j+1 = 0,
so
qc,j =
1
2
(qc+1,j + qc+1,j+1) = 0.
If j = k − (n− c) then
qc+1,j = 0,
and
qc,j =
1
2n−c
n−c∑
i=n−c
(
n− c
i
)
=
1
2n−c
n−(c+1)∑
i=n−(c+1)
(
n− (c+ 1)
i
)
=
1
2
(qc+1,j+1+qc+1,j).
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Finally, if k − (n− c) + 1 < j < k − 1 then
qc,j =
1
2n−c
n−c∑
i=k−j
(
n− c
i
)
=
1
2n−c
1 + n−(c+1)∑
i=k−j
(
n− c
i
)
=
1
2n−c
1 + n−(c+1)∑
i=k−j
(
n− (c+ 1)
i
)
+
n−(c+1)∑
i=k−j
(
n− (c+ 1)
i− 1
)
=
1
2n−c
n−(c+1)∑
i=k−j
(
n− (c+ 1)
i
)
+
1 + n−(c+1)∑
i=k−j
(
n− (c+ 1)
i− 1
)
=
1
2n−c
n−(c+1)∑
i=k−j
(
n− (c+ 1)
i
)
+
n−(c+1)∑
i=k−(j+1)
(
n− (c+ 1)
i
)
=
1
2
(qc+1,j + qc+1,j+1)
Lemma 1.3. If c < k then qc,c < qc+1,c+1
Proof.
qc,c =
1
2
(qc+1,c + qc+1,c+1) (Lemma 1.2)
<
1
2
(qc+1,c+1 + qc+1,c+1) (Lemma 1.1)
= qc+1,c+1
Finally, we consider a quantity Q(c), the sum of q over all possible states
for an occurrence of size c. The value Q(c) acts as a normalization term when
calculating the cause repertoire of occurrence {Yt = 1}. Here we demonstrate a
relationship between these normalization terms across occurrences of different
sizes,
Lemma 1.4. Let Q(c) =
c∑
j=0
(
c
j
)
qc,j then Q(c) =
1
2Q(c+ 1)
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Proof.
Q(c) =
c∑
j=0
(
c
j
)
qc,j
=
1
2
c∑
j=0
(
c
j
)
(qc+1,j + qc+1,j+1)
=
1
2
 c∑
j=1
(
c
j − 1
)
qc+1,j +
c∑
j=0
(
c
j
)
qc+1,j

=
1
2
qc+1,c+1 + qc+1,0 + c∑
j=1
(
c+ 1
j
)
qc+1,j

=
1
2
c+1∑
j=0
(
c+ 1
j
)
qc+1,j

=
1
2
Q(c+ 1)
Using the above lemmas, we are now in a position to prove the actual causes
and actual effects in the causal account of a single LTU in the ‘ON’ state. The
causal account for a LTU in the ‘OFF’ state follows by symmetry.
Theorem 1.5. Consider a dynamical causal network Gu such that Vt = {Yt}
is a linear threshold unit with n inputs and threshold k ≤ n, and Vt−1 is the set
of n inputs to Yt. For a transition vt−1 ≺ vt−1, with yt = 1 and
∑
vt−1 ≥ k,
the following holds:
1. The actual cause of {Yt = 1} is an occurrence {Xt−1 = xt−1} with |xt−1| =
k and min(xt−1) = 1. Furthermore, the causal strength of the link is
αmaxc (yt) = k − log2
 k∑
j=0
qk,j
 > 0.
2. If min(xt−1) = 1 and |xt−1| ≤ k then the actual effect of {Xt−1 = xt−1}
is {Yt = 1} with causal strength
αe(xt−1, yt) = log2
(
qc,c
qc−1,c−1
)
> 0,
otherwise {Xt−1 = xt−1} is reducible (αmaxe (xt−1) = 0).
Proof. Part 1: Consider an occurrence {Xt−1 = xt−1} such that |xt−1| = c ≤ n
and
∑
x∈xt−1
x = j, the probability of xt−1 in the cause-repertoire of yt is
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pi(xt−1|yt) = qc,j
Q(c)
.
Since Yt is a first-order occurrence, there is only one possible partition, and the
causal strength of a potential link is thus
αc(xt−1, yt) = ρc(xt−1, yt) = log2
(
pi(xt−1|yt)
pi(xt−1)
)
= log2
(
2cqc,j
Q(c)
)
.
For a fixed value of c, the maximum value of causal strength occurs at j = c
(since adding ‘ON’ elements can only increase q(c, j), Lemma 1.1),
max
|xt−1|=c
αc(xt−1, yt) = max
j
log2
(
2cqc,j
Q(c)
)
= log2
(
2cqc,c
Q(c)
)
Applying Lemma 1.3 and Lemma 1.4, we see that across different values of c,
this maximum is increasing for 0 < c < k,
max
|xt−1|=c+1
αc(xt−1, yt)− max|xt−1|=cαc(xt−1, yt) = log2
(
2c+1qc+1,c+1
Q(c+ 1)
)
− log2
(
2cqc,c
Q(c)
)
= log2
(
2c+1qc+1,c+1Q(c)
2cqc,cQ(c+ 1)
)
= log2
(
qc+1,c+1
qc,c
)
> 0,
and that for k ≤ c the causal strength is constant,
max
|xt−1|=c+1
αc(xt−1, yt)− max|xt−1|=cαc(xt−1, yt) = log2
(
2c+1qc+1,c+1
Q(c+ 1)
)
− log2
(
2cqc,c
Q(c)
)
= log2
(
qc+1,c+1
qc,c
)
= log2
(
1
1
)
= 0.
By setting c = j ≥ k we find the maximum causal strength is
αmaxc (yt) = log2
(
2cqc,c
Q(c)
)
= log2
(
2k
Q(k)
)
= k − log2
 k∑
j=0
qk,j
 > 0.
Any occurrence xt−1 with j ≥ k has maximal causal strength and satisfies
condition (1) of being an actual cause,
αc(xt−1, yt) = log2
(
2cqc,j
Q(c)
)
= log2
(
2k
Q(k)
)
= αmaxc (yt).
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If c ≥ k, then there exists a subset x′t−1 ⊂ xt−1 with j′ ≥ k and c′ < c such
that x′t−1 also satisfies condition (1) and thus xt−1 does not satisfy condition
(2). However, if j = c = k, then any subset x′t−1 of xt−1 has j
′ < k, so
αc(x
′
t−1, yt) = log2
(
2c
′
qc′,j′
Q(c′)
)
< log2
(
2c
Q(c)
)
= α(xt−1, yt),
and thus xt−1 satisfies condition (2). Therefore, we have that the actual cause
of yt is an occurrence xt−1 such that |xt−1| = k and minxt−1 = 1,
x∗(yt) = {xt−1 ⊂ vt−1 | minxt−1 = 1, and |xt−1| = k}.
Part 2: Again, consider occurrences Xt−1 = xt−1 with |xt−1| = c and∑
x∈xt−1
x = j. The probability of yt in the effect repertoire of such an occur-
rence is
pi(yt|xt−1) = qc,j =

n−c∑
i=k−j
1
2n−c
(
n−c
i
)
if j ≤ k and j > k − (n− c)
1 if j ≥ k
0 if j < k − (n− c)
Since there is only one element in vt, the only question is whether or not xt−1
is reducible. If it is reducible, it has no actual effect, otherwise its actual effect
must be yt. First, if j < c, then ∃ x = 0 ∈ xt−1 and we can define a partition
ψ = {{(xt−1 − x), yt}, {x,∅}} such that
pi(yt|xt−1)ψ = pi(yt|(xt−1 − x))× pi(∅|x) = pi(yt|(xt−1 − x)) = qc−1,j
and
αe(xt−1, yt) ≤ log2
(
pi(yt|xt−1)
pi(yt|xt−1)ψ
)
= log2
(
qc,j
qc−1,j
)
≤ 0 (Lemma1.1/1.2),
so xt−1 is reducible. Next we consider the case where j = c but c > k. In this
case we define a partition ψ = {{(xt−1 − x), yt}, {x,∅}} (where x ∈ xt−1 is any
element), such that
pi(yt|xt−1)ψ = pi(yt|(xt−1 − x))× pi(∅|x) = pi(yt|(xt−1 − x)) = qc−1,c−1,
and since c > k,
αe(xt−1, yt) ≤ log2
(
pi(yt|xt−1)
pi(yt|xt−1)ψ
)
= log2
(
qc,c
qc−1,c−1
)
= log2
(
1
1
)
= 0,
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so xt−1 is again reducible. Lastly, we show that for j = c and c ≤ k, that
xt−1 is irreducible with actual effect {Yt = 1}. All possible partitions of the
pair of occurrences can be formulated as ψ = {{(xt−1 − x), yt}, {x,∅}} (where
x ⊆ xt−1 with |x| = d > 0), such that
pi(yt|xt−1)ψ = pi(yt|(xt−1 − x))× pi(∅|x) = pi(yt|(xt−1 − x)) = qc−d,c−d,
and
αe(xt−1, yt) = min
ψ
log2
(
pi(yt|xt−1)
pi(yt|xt−1)ψ
)
= min
d
log2
(
qc,c
qc−d,c−d
)
.
The minimum information partition occurs when d = 1 (Lemma 1.3) and thus
{Xt−1 = xt−1} is irreducible with actual effect {Yt = 1} and causal strength
αe(xt−1, yt) = log2
(
qc,c
qc−1,c−1
)
.
Supplementary Proof 2
The second theorem describes the actual causes and effects for an observation
of a disjunction of conjunctions (DOC) Vt = {Yt} that is a disjunction of k
conjunctions, each over nj elements, and its inputs Vt−1 = {{Vi,j,t−1}nji=1}kj=1.
The total number of inputs to the DOC element is n =
∑k
j=1 nj . We consider
occurrences xt−1 that contain cj ≤ nj elements from each of the k conjunctions,
and the total number of elements is |xt−1| = c =
∑k
j=1 cj . To simplify notation,
we further define x¯j,t−1 = {vi,j,t−1}nji=1, an occurrence with cj = nj and cj′ = 0
if j′ 6= j. In other words, x¯j,t−1 is the set of elements that make up the jth
conjunction. First, a series of lemmas are demonstrated based on the transition
probabilities q(s):
q(s) = p(Yt = 1|xt−1 = s)
To isolate the specific conjunctions, we define sj ⊂ xt−1 to be the state of
Xt−1 within the jth conjunction, and s¯j = ∪ji=1si ⊆ xt−1 be the state Xt−1
within the first j conjunctions. For a DOC with k conjunctions, we consider
occurrences with cj elements from each conjunction, Xt−1 = {{xi,j,t−1}cji=1}kj=1.
In the specific case of a disjunction of two conjunctions,
q(s1, s2) =

0 if min(s1) = min(s2) = 0
1
2n1−c1 if min(s1) = 1, min(s2) = 0
1
2n2−c2 if min(s1) = 0, min(s2) = 1
2n1−c1+2n2−c2−1
2n1+n2−c1−c2 if min(s1) = min(s2) = 1,
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and in the case of k > 2 conjunctions, we define the probability recursively
q(s¯k−1, sk) =
{
q(s¯k−1) if min(sk) = 0
q(s¯k−1) +
(1−q(s¯k−1))
2nk−ck if min(sk) = 1
The first two lemmas demonstrate the effect of adding an additional element
to an occurrence. Adding an ‘ON’ input to an occurrence xt−1 can never decrease
the probability of {Yt = 1}, while adding an ‘OFF’ input to an occurrence xt−1
can never increase the probability of {Yt = 1}.
Lemma 2.1. If {xt−1 = s} = {x′t−1 = s′, xi,j,t−1 = 1}, then q(s′) ≤ q(s).
Proof. The proof is given by induction. We first consider the case where k = 2.
Assume w.l.g. that the additional element xi,j,t−1 is from the first conjunction
(c1 = c
′
1 + 1, c2 = c
′
2). If min(s
′
1) = 0 then q(s
′) = q(s). If min(s′2) = 0 and
min(s′1) = 1 then
q(s′)
q(s)
=
2n1−(c
′
1+1)
2n1−c′1
=
1
2
< 1,
so q(s′) < q(s). Lastly, if min(s′1) = min(s
′
2) = 1 then
q(s′)
q(s)
=
2n1+n2−(c
′
1+1)−c′2(2n1−c
′
1 + 2n2−c
′
2 − 1)
2n1+n2−c′1−c′2(2n1−(c′1+1) + 2n2−c′2 − 1) =
2n1−c
′
1 + 2n2−c
′
2 − 1
2n1−c′1 + 2(2n2−c′2 − 1) < 1.
Therefore, when k = 2 we have that q(s′) ≤ q(s). Next, we assume the result
holds for k − 1, q(s¯′k−1) ≤ q(s¯k−1) and demonstrate the result for general k.
Again, assume the additional element is from the first conjunction (c1 = c
′
1 +
1, cj = c
′
j for j > 1). If min(sk) = 0 then
q(s¯′k)
q(s¯k)
=
q(s¯′k−1)
q(s¯k−1)
≤ 1,
and if min(sk) = 1 then
q(s¯′k)
q(s¯k)
=
q(s¯′k−1) + (1− q(s¯′k−1))/2nk−ck
q(s¯k−1) + (1− q(s¯k−1))/2nk−ck
=
(2nk−ck − 1)q(s¯′k−1) + 1
(2nk−ck − 1)q(s¯k−1) + 1 ≤ 1.
Lemma 2.2. If {xt−1 = s} = {x′t−1 = s′, xi,j,t−1 = 0}, then q(s′) ≥ q(s).
Proof. The proof is given by induction. We first consider the case where k = 2.
Assume w.l.g. that the additional element is from the first conjunction (c1 =
c′1+1, c2 = c
′
2). If min(s
′
1) = 0 then q(s
′) = q(s). If min(s′2) = 0 and min(s
′
1) = 1
then
Albantakis et al./Supplementary Proofs 9
q(s′) =
1
2n1−c′1
> 0 = q(s)
Lastly, if min(s′1) = min(s
′
2) = 1 then
q(s′)
q(s)
=
2n2−c
′
2(2n1−c
′
1 + 2n2−c
′
2 − 1)
2n1+n2−c′1−c′2
=
2n1−c
′
1 + 2n2−c
′
2 − 1
2n1−c′1
≥ 1
Therefore, when k = 2 we have that q(s′) ≥ q(s). Next, we assume the result
holds for k − 1, q(s¯′k−1) ≥ q(s¯k−1) and demonstrate the result for general k.
Again, assume the additional element is from the first conjunction (c1 = c
′
1 +
1, cj = c
′
j for j > 1). If min(sk) = 0 then
q(s¯′k)
q(s¯k)
=
q(s¯′k−1)
q(s¯k−1)
≤ 1,
and if min(sk) = 1 then
q(s¯′k)
q(s¯k)
=
q(s¯′k−1) + (1− q(s¯′k−1))/2nk−ck
q(s¯k−1) + (1− q(s¯k−1))/2nk−ck
=
(2nk−ck − 1)q(s¯′k−1) + 1
(2nk−ck − 1)q(s¯k−1) + 1 ≥ 1.
Next, we again consider a normalization term Q(c), which is the sum of q(s)
over all states of the occurrence. Here we demonstrate the effect on Q(c) of
adding an additional element to an occurrence.
Lemma 2.3. For an occurrence {Xt−1 = xt−1} with |xt−1| = c > 0, define
Q(c) =
∑
s q(s). Now consider adding a single element to an occurrence, x
′
t−1 =
{xt−1, xi,j1,t−1}, (xi,j1,t−1 /∈ xt−1) such that c′j1 = cj1 +1 and c′j = cj for j 6= j1,
so that c′ = c+ 1. Then Q(c
′)
Q(c) = 2.
Proof. The proof is again given by induction. We first consider the case where
k = 2,
Q(c) =
∑
s
q(s)
=
2c1 − 1
2n2−c2
+
2c2 − 1
2n1−c1
+
2n1−c1 + 2n2−c2 − 1
2n1+n2−c1−c2
=
2n1 + 2n2 − 1
2n1+n2−c1−c2
Assume w.l.g. that the additional element to the first conjunction (c′1 = c1 + 1).
Then we have that
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Q(c′)
Q(c)
=
2n1+n2−c1−c2(2n1 + 2n2 − 1)
2n1+n2−c′1−c′2(2n1 + 2n2 − 1) =
2n1+n2−c1−c2
2n1+n2−(c1+1)−c2
= 2
Therefore, when k = 2 we have that Q(c
′)
Q(c) = 2. Next, we assume the result
holds for k − 1 and demonstrate the result for general k. Using the recursive
relationship for q, we get
Qk(c) =
∑
s¯k
q(s¯k)
=
∑
sk
∑
s¯k−1
q(s¯k−1, sk)
= (2ck − 1)
∑
s¯k−1
q(s¯k−1) +
∑
s¯k−1
(
q(s¯k−1) +
(1− q(s¯k−1))
2nk−ck
)
=
(2nk − 1)Qk−1(c− ck) + 2c−ck
2nk−ck
,
Again, assume the additional element is from the first conjunction c′1 = c1 + 1,
for the ratio we have
Qk(c
′)
Qk(c)
=
(2nk − 1)Qk−1(c′ − c′k) + 2c
′−c′k
(2nk − 1)Qk−1(c− ck) + 2c−ck
=
(2nk − 1)2Qk−1(c− ck) + 2(c−ck)+1
(2nk − 1)Qk−1(c− ck) + 2c−ck
= 2
(
(2nk − 1)Qk−1(x′t−1) + 2c−ck
(2nk − 1)Qk−1(x′t−1) + 2c−ck
)
= 2
The final two Lemmas demonstrate conditions under which the probability
of {Yt = 1} is either strictly increasing or strictly decreasing.
Lemma 2.4. If min(xt−1) = 1, cj < nj ∀ j and x′t−1 ⊂ xt−1 then q(s′) < q(s).
Proof. The proof is given by induction. We first consider the case where k =
2. Assume w.l.g. that xt−1 has an additional element in the first conjunction
relative to x′t−1 (c1 = c
′
1 + 1, c2 = c
′
2). The result can be applied recursively for
differences of more than one element.
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q(s)
q(s′)
=
(
2n1−c1 + 2n2−c2 − 1
2n1−c′1 + 2n2−c′2 − 1
)(
2n1+n2−c
′
1−c′2
2n1+n2−c1−c2
)
= 2
(
2n1−c1 + 2n2−c2 − 1
2n1−c1+1 + 2n2−c2 − 1
)
> 1 (since c2 < n2)
Therefore, when k = 2 we have that q(s′) < q(s). Next, we assume the result
holds for k − 1, q(s¯′k−1) < q(s¯k−1) and demonstrate the result for general k.
Again, assume that xt−1 and x′t−1 differ by a single element in the first con-
junction (c1 = c
′
1 + 1, cj = c
′
j for j > 1). Since min(sk) = 1,
q(s¯k)
q(s¯′k)
=
q(s¯′k−1) + (1− q(s¯′k−1))/2nk−ck
q(s¯k−1) + (1− q(s¯k−1))/2nk−ck
=
(2nk−ck − 1)q(s¯′k−1) + 1
(2nk−ck − 1)q(s¯k−1) + 1
> 1.
Lemma 2.5. If max(xt−1) = 0 , cj ≤ 1 ∀ j and x′t−1 ⊂ xt−1 then q(s) < q(s′).
Proof. The proof is given by induction. We first consider the case where k =
2. Assume w.l.g. that xt−1 has an additional element in the first conjunction
relative to x′t−1 (c1 = c
′
1 + 1 = 1, c2 = c
′
2). The result can be applied recursively
for differences of more than one element. First, consider the case where c2 = 1.
Then we have
q(s′) =
1
2n2−c2
> 0 = q(s).
Next consider the case where c2 = 0:
q(s′) =
2n1 + 2n2 − 1
2n1+n2
=
1
2n2
(
2n1 + 2n2 − 1
2n1
)
= q(s)
(
2n1 + 2n2 − 1
2n1
)
> q(s).
Therefore, when k = 2 we have that q(s) < q(s′). Next, we assume the result
holds for k − 1, q(s¯k−1) < q(s¯′k−1), and demonstrate the result for general
k. Again, assume that xt−1 and x′t−1 differ by a single element in the first
conjunction (c1 = c
′
1 + 1, cj = c
′
j for j > 1). Since min(sk) = 0,
q(s¯k)
q(s¯′k)
=
q(s¯k−1)
q(s¯′k−1)
< 1.
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Using the above Lemmas, we are now in a position to prove the actual causes
and actual effects in the causal account of a single DOC and its inputs. We
separately consider the case where the DOC is in the ‘ON’ and the ‘OFF’ state.
Theorem 2.6. Consider a dynamical causal network Gu such that Vt = {Yt}
is a DOC element that is a disjunction of k conditions, each of which is a
conjunction of nj inputs, and Vt−1 = {{Vi,j,t−1}nji=1}kj=1 is the set of its n =∑
j nj inputs. For a transition vt−1 ≺ vt, the following holds:
1. If yt = 1,
(a) The actual cause of {Yt = 1} is an occurrence {Xt−1 = xt−1} where
xt−1 = {xi,j,t−1}nji=1 ⊆ vt−1 such that min(xt−1) = 1.
(b) The actual effect of {Xt−1 = xt−1} is {Yt = 1} if min(xt−1) = 1 and
|xt−1| = cj = nj; otherwise xt−1 is reducible.
2. If yt = 0,
(a) The actual cause of {Yt = 0} is an occurrence xt−1 ⊆ vt−1 such that
max(xt−1) = 0 and cj = 1 ∀ j.
(b) If max(xt−1) = 0 and cj ≤ 1 ∀ j then the actual effect of {Xt−1 =
xt−1} is {Yt = 0}; otherwise xt−1 is reducible.
Proof. Part 1a: The actual cause of {Yt = 1}. For an occurrence {Xt−1 =
xt−1}, the probability of xt−1 in the cause repertoire of yt is
pi(xt−1 | yt) = q(s)
Q(c)
.
Since Yt is a first-order occurrence, there is only one possible partition, and the
causal strength of a potential link is thus
αc(xt−1, yt) = log2
(
pi(xt−1 | yt)
pi(xt−1)
)
= log2
(
2cq(s)
Q(c)
)
= log2 (Q1q(s)) ,
where Q1 =
2c
Q(c) ∀ c (Lemma 2.3). If we then consider adding a single element
to the occurrence x′t−1 = {xt−1, x′i,j,t−1} (x′i,j,t−1 /∈ xt−1) then the difference in
causal strength is
αc(xt−1, yt)− αc(x′t−1, yt) = log2
(
Q1 q(s)
Q1 q(s′)
)
= log2
(
q(s)
q(s′)
)
Combining the above with Lemma 2.2, adding an element xi,j,t−1 = 0 to an oc-
currence cannot increase the causal strength, and thus occurrences that include
elements in state ‘OFF’ cannot be the actual cause of yt. By Lemma 2.1, adding
an element xi,j,t−1 = 1 to an occurrence cannot decrease the causal strength.
Furthermore, if cj = nj and min(x¯j,t−1) = 1, then q(s) = 1 and
αc(yt, xt−1) = log2 (Q1q(s)) = log2(Q1),
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independent of the number of elements in the occurrence from other conjunctions
cj′ and their states sj′ (j
′ 6= j). Since the value Q1 does not depend on the
specific value of j, it must be the case that this is the maximum value of causal
strength, αmax(yt). Furthermore, if cj < nj ∀ j then
αc(yt, xt−1) = log2 (Q1q(s)) < log2 (Q1) .
Therefore, the maximum value of causal strength is
log2 (Q1) ,
and an occurrence xt−1 achieves this value (satisfying condition (1) of being an
actual cause) if and only if there exists j such that cj = nj and min(x¯j,t−1) = 1,
i.e. the occurrence includes a conjunction whose elements are all ‘ON’. Consider
an occurrence that satisfies condition (1), such that there exists j1 with cj1 =
nj1 . If there exists j2 6= j1 such that cj2 > 0, then we can define a subset
x′t−1 ⊂ xt−1 with c′j1 = nj1 and c′j2 = 0 that also satisfies condition (1), and thus
xt−1 does not satisfy condition (2). Finally, if no such j2 exists (xt−1 = x¯j,t−1)
then any subset x′t−1 ⊂ xt−1 has cj < nj ∀j and does not satisfy condition (1),
so xt−1 satisfies condition (2). Therefore, we have that the actual cause of yt is
an occurrence xt−1 = x¯j,t−1 such that minxt−1 = 1,
x∗(yt) = {x¯j,t−1 ⊂ vt−1 | min x¯j,t−1 = 1}.
Part 1b: Actual effect of xt−1 when yt = 1. Again, consider occurrences
Xt−1 = xt−1 with cj elements from each of the k conjunctions. The effect
repertoire of a DOC with k conjunctions over such occurrences is
pi(yt | xt−1 = s) = q(s)
Since there is only one element in vt, the only question is whether or not xt−1 is
reducible. If it is reducible, it has no actual effect, otherwise its actual effect must
be yt. First, if there exists x ∈ xt−1 with x = 0 then we can define x′t−1 such
that xt−1 = {x′t−1, x}, and a partition ψ =
{{x′t−1, yt}, {x,∅}}, i.e. cutting
away x, such that
pi(yt | xt−1)ψ = pi(yt | x′t−1)× pi(∅ | x) = pi(yt | x′t−1) = q(s′),
By Lemma 2.2, q(s′) ≥ q(s), and thus
αe(xt−1, yt) ≤ log2
(
pi(yt | xt−1)
pi(yt | xt−1)ψ
)
= log2
(
q(s)
q(s′)
)
≤ 0,
so xt−1 is reducible. Next we consider the case where min(xt−1) = 1, but there
exists j1, j2 such that cj1 = nj1 and cj2 > 0. We define x
′
t−1 = x¯j1,t−1 and a
partition ψ =
{{x′t−1, yt}, (xt−1 \ x′t−1),∅}}, such that
pi(yt | xt−1)ψ = pi(yt | x′t−1)× pi(∅ | (xt−1 − x′t−1)) = pi(yt | x′t−1) = q(s′),
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and thus
αe(xt−1, yt) ≤ log2
(
pi(yt | xt−1)
pi(yt | xt−1)ψ
)
= log2
(
q(s)
q(s′)
)
= log2
(
1
1
)
= 0,
so xt−1 is again reducible. We now split the irreducible occurrences into two
cases. First, we consider min(xt−1) = 1 and all cj < nj . All possible partitions of
the pair of occurrences can be formulated as ψ =
{{x′t−1, yt}, {(xt−1 \ x′t−1),∅}}
(where x′t−1 ⊂ xt−1), such that
pi(yt | xt−1)ψ = pi(yt | x′t−1))× pi(∅ | (xt−1 − x′t−1) = pi(yt | x′t−1) = q(s′),
and by Lemma 2.4,
αe(xt−1, yt) = min
ψ
(
log2
(
pi(yt | xt−1)
pi(yt | xt−1)ψ
))
= min
ψ
(
log2
(
q(s)
q(s′)
))
> 0.
So xt−1 is irreducible, and its actual effect is {Y1 = 1}. Next we consider oc-
currences such that min(xt−1) = 1, cj1 = nj1 , and cj = 0 for j 6= j1 (i.e.
xt−1 = x¯j1,t−1). All possible partitions of the pair of occurrences can be formu-
lated as ψ =
{{x′t−1, yt}, {(xt−1 − x′t−1,∅}} (where x′t−1 ⊂ xt−1), such that
pi(yt | xt−1)ψ = pi(yt | x′t−1)× pi(∅ | (xt−1 − x′t−1) = pi(yt | x′t−1) = q(s′),
αe(xt−1, yt) ≤ log2
(
pi(yt | xt−1)
pi(yt | xt−1)ψ
)
= log2
(
q(s)
q(s′)
)
= log2
(
1
q(s′)
)
> 0,
and xt−1 is again irreducible with actual effect {Yt = 1}.
Part 2a: The actual cause of {Yt = 0}. For an occurrence {Xt−1 = xt−1}
the cause repertoire of yt is
pi(xt−1 | yt) = 1− q(s)
2c −Q(c) .
Since Yt is a first-order occurrence, there is only one possible partition, and the
causal strength of a potential link is thus
αc(xt−1, yt) = log2
(
pi(xt−1 | yt)
pi(xt−1)
)
= log2
(
2c(1− q(s))
2c −Q(c)
)
= log2 (Q0 q(s)) ,
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whereQ0 =
2c
2c−Q(c) ∀ c (Lemma 2.3). If we then consider adding a single element
to the occurrence x′t−1 = {xt−1, x′i,j,t−1} (x′i,j,t−1 /∈ xt−1), then the difference
in causal strength is
αc(xt−1, yt)− αc(x′t−1, yt) = log2
(
Q0(1− q(s))
Q0(1− q(s′))
)
= log2
(
1− q(s)
1− q(s′)
)
By Lemma 2.2, adding an element x = 1 to an occurrence cannot increase
the causal strength, and thus occurrences that include elements in state ‘ON’
cannot be the actual cause of yt. By Lemma 2.1, adding an element x = 0 to an
occurrence cannot decrease the causal strength. If cj > 0 ∀ j and max(xt−1) = 0,
then
αc(yt, xt−1) = log2 (Q0(1− q(s))) = log2 (Q0) ,
independent of the actual values of cj . Since this holds for any set of cj that sat-
isfies the conditions, it must be the case that this value is αmax(yt). Furthermore,
if there exists j such that cj = 0 then
αc(yt, xt−1) = log2 (Q0(1− q(s))) < log2 (Q0) .
Therefore, the maximum value of causal strength is
log2 (Q0) ,
and an occurrence xt−1 achieves this value (satisfying condition (1) of being an
actual cause) if and only if cj > 0∀ j and max(xt−1) = 0, i.e. the occurrence
contains elements from every conjunction, and only elements whose state is
‘OFF’.
Consider an occurrence xt−1 that satisfies condition (1). If there exists j1
such that cj1 > 1, then we can define a subset x
′
t−1 ⊂ xt−1 with c′j1 = 1 that
also satisfies condition (1), and thus xt−1 does not satisfy condition (2). Finally,
if cj = 1∀ j then for any subset x′t−1 ⊂ xt−1 there exists j such that c′j = 0,
so x′t−1 does not satisfy condition (1), and thus xt−1 satisfies condition (2).
Therefore, we have that the actual cause of yt is an occurrence xt−1 such that
maxxt−1 = 0 and cj = 1∀ j,
x∗(yt) = {xt−1 ⊆ vt−1 | max(xt−1) = 0 and cj = 1∀ j}.
Part 2b: Actual effect of xt−1 when yt = 0. Again, consider occurrences
Xt−1 = xt−1 with cj elements from each of k conjunctions. The probability of
yt in the effect repertoire of xt−1 is
pi(yt | xt−1 = s) = 1− q(s).
Since there is only one element in vt, the only question is whether or not xt−1
is reducible. If it is reducible, it has no actual effect, otherwise its actual ef-
fect must be yt. First, if there exists xi,j,t−1 ∈ xt−1 such that xi,j,t−1 = 1
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then we can define x′t−1 such that xt−1 = {x′t−1, xi,j,t−1} and a partition
ψ =
{{x′t−1, yt}, {xi,j,t−1,∅}} such that
pi(yt | xt−1)ψ = pi(yt | x′t−1)× pi(∅ | xi, j, t− 1) = pi(yt | x′t−1) = 1− q(s′).
By Lemma 2.1, we have 1− q(s) ≤ 1− q(s′), and thus
αe(xt−1, yt) ≤ log2
(
pi(yt | xt−1)
pi(yt | xt−1)ψ
)
= log2
(
1− q(s)
1− q(s′)
)
≤ 0,
so xt−1 is reducible. Next we consider the case where max(xt−1) = 0, but
there exists j such that cj > 1. We define x
′
t−1 with c
′
j = 1 ∀ j such that
xt−1 = {x′t−1, xi,j,t−1}, and a partition ψ =
{{x′t−1, yt}, {xi,j,t−1,∅}}, such
that
pi(yt | xt−1)ψ = pi(yt | x′t−1)× pi(∅ | xi,j,t−1) = pi(yt | x′t−1) = q(s′) = 1
and
αe(xt−1, yt) ≤ log2
(
pi(yt | xt−1)
pi(yt | xt−1)ψ
)
= log2
(
1− q(s)
1− q(s′)
)
= log2
(
1
1
)
= 0,
so xt−1 is again reducible. Finally, we show that occurrences xt−1 are irreducible
if max(xt−1) = 0 and all cj ≤ 1. All possible partitions of the pair of occurrences
can be formulated as ψ =
{{x′t−1, yt}, {(xt−1 \ x′t−1),∅}} (where x′t−1 ⊂ xt−1),
such that c′j ≤ cj ∀ j, and c′ < c. Then
pi(yt | xt−1)ψ = pi(yt | x′t−1)× pi(∅ | (xt−1 − x′t−1)) = pi(yt | x′t−1) = 1− q(s′),
and by Lemma 2.5,
αe(xt−1, yt) = min
ψ
(
log2
(
pi(yt | xt−1)
pi(yt | xt−1)ψ
))
= min
ψ
(
log2
(
1− q(s)
1− q(s′)
))
> 0.
So {Xt−1 = xt−1} is irreducible, and its actual effect is {Y1 = 1}.
